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Abstract
The prevalence of medical misdiagnosis has remained high despite the adoption of
diagnostic software. This ongoing controversy about the role of technology in mitigating
the problem of misdiagnosis centers on the question of whether diagnostic software does
reduce the incidence of misdiagnosis if properly relied upon by physicians. The purpose
of this quantitative, cross-sectional study based on planned behavior theory was to
measure doctors’ opinions of diagnostic technology’s medical utility. Recruitment emails were sent to 3,100 AMA-accredited physicians through their database that yielded
a sample of 99 physicians for the study. One-sample t tests and, where appropriate
because of non-normal data, one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were conducted on
the data to address the following key research questions on whether diagnostic software
decreases misdiagnosis in healthcare versus unassisted human diagnostic method, if
physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in
healthcare, and if liability concerns prevent physicians from using diagnostic software. It
was found that in the opinion of those surveyed (a) diagnostic software was likely to
result in fewer misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods, (b)
when speaking for themselves, physicians thought they used diagnostic software
frequently enough to decrease misdiagnoses, and (c) physicians agreed they were not
prevented from using diagnostic software because of liability concerns. The study’s
social significance is the affirmation of diagnostic software’s usefulness: Policy and
technology stakeholders can use this finding to speed the adoption of diagnostic software,
leading to a reduction in the socially costly problem of misdiagnosis.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Background
Medical misdiagnosis is an immensely costly problem. Globally, misdiagnosis is
responsible for millions of patient deaths every year; in the United States, about 100,000
people die every year because of misdiagnosis (Leavitt & Leavitt, 2011). Misdiagnosis
leads to economic costs as well, by raising the already high cost of healthcare delivery.
The costs of an inaccurate or slow diagnosis are high and include costs of delayed
treatment, litigation, malpractice insurance payouts, and the lost economic productivity of
the patient (Schweitzer, 2007). The dynamics of medical decision-making are changing
in response to increased pressures on the global healthcare system. In developed
countries, the amount of money spent on healthcare is typically the largest single
component of gross domestic product (GDP; Krugman & Wells, 2009). Given the human
and economic problems created by misdiagnosis, there is added pressure to bring new
efficiencies to the delivery of healthcare (Cleverly, Cleverly, & Song, 2010). These
pressures affect the practice of diagnosis, specifically in creating an imperative for
diagnoses to be made more quickly and accurately (Goldsmith, 2011).
The combination of these pressures and the availability of increasingly
sophisticated medical technology have resulted in the popularity of diagnostic medical
software in most developed countries (Scott & Rundall, 2007). Diagnostic software has
been widely available since the 1990s, but advancements in the underlying artificial
intelligence (AI) of such software and its integration with other aspects of healthcare
information technology have resulted in an increase in the use of diagnostic software in
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the United Kingdom (Graham, 2010; Hawe, 2010) and the United States in particular
(Cleverly et al., 2010). This development has been praised as well as critiqued
(Spekowius & Wendler, 2006). Supporters of diagnostic software emphasize its accuracy
and speed; detractors of diagnostic software have suggested that the use of such software
predisposes physicians to be lazy (Arora, 2010), and that diagnostic software can make
inaccurate recommendations when dealing with complex or nuanced medical problems
(Bligh, 2009). Thus, the immediate background for this study was the ongoing
controversy (Ahlers, Jaeger, & Jakstat, 2010) about the role of technology in mitigating
the problem of misdiagnosis. The first part of the controversy centered on the question of
whether diagnostic software can indeed reduce the incidence of misdiagnosis but is not
properly relied upon by physicians for this end. The other part questioned whether
diagnostic software could not reduce the incidence of misdiagnosis because misdiagnosis
emerges from factors that are beyond the ability of diagnostic software to address. What
was already known is that, despite an adoption rate that has been estimated between 55
and 70% (Chernick, 2011; Felder & Mayrhofer, 2011), the implementation rate of
diagnostic software has not coincided with a reduction in the prevalence of misdiagnosis;
what was not known is why the use of diagnostic software has not concomitantly
reduced diagnostic error rates.
In this chapter, I describe the problem statement, identify a meaningful gap in the
current research literature, and present evidence that the problem is relevant and
demanded attention. I present theoretical framework that is associated with the
foundation of the study and frame the research questions, hypotheses, research design,

3
and methodology in a manner that built upon the existing research. I discuss the purpose,
nature, and the significance of the study. I describe the potential contributions of the
study to the advancement of the discipline as well as the social change implication in
accordance to the scope of the study.
Problem Statement
The problem is the prevalence of high levels of misdiagnosis (Leavitt & Leavitt,
2011) despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software and the improvements in
such software over time. Throughout the literature, authors have suggested several
possibilities for why this problem might exist. There have been suggestions that the
inherent possibility of misdiagnosis is high because of the interaction of several complex
factors that cannot be addressed by software (Sokolowski & Banks, 2011). There were
also suggestions that diagnostic software is capable of reducing misdiagnosis but that
physicians insufficiently or infrequently rely upon it. The academic dimension of this
problem was the absence of more definitive knowledge why misdiagnosis has persisted
well into the age of diagnostic software (Sokolowski & Banks, 2011).
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quantitative study was to draw upon physician-provided data
to determine why, at least in physicians’ opinions, the prevalence of misdiagnosis has
remained high despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software. For the first two
research questions of the study, the independent variable was whether diagnostic software
was used, and the dependent variable was reduction of misdiagnosis. For the third
research question of the study, the independent variable was knowledge of diagnostic
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software, and the dependent variable was reduction of misdiagnosis. For the fourth
research question of the study, the independent variable was liability concern, and the
dependent variable was use of diagnostic software.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The research questions that guided the study were as follows:
Research Question 1: Does use of diagnostic software decrease misdiagnosis in
healthcare versus unassisted human diagnostic methods?
H01: Diagnostic software use has more misdiagnoses in healthcare than
unassisted human diagnostic methods.
HA1: Diagnostic software use has less misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted
human diagnostic methods.
Research Question 2: Do physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?
H02: Physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnosis in healthcare.
HA2: Physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnosis in healthcare.
Research Question 3: Is physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software extensive
enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?
H03: Physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.
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HA3: Physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is extensive enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.
Research Question 4: Do liability concerns prevent physicians from using
diagnostic software?
H04: Liability concerns do not prevent physicians from using diagnostic software.
HA4: Liability concerns prevent physicians from using diagnostic software.
Nature of the Study
Addressing the question of why the widespread adoption of diagnostic software
has not coincided with a decrease in the prevalence of misdiagnosis could be achieved
with both a quantitative and a qualitative approach. A quantitative approach could
determine which of the possible answers to this question—diagnostic software
insufficiency, insufficient/improper use by physicians, liability, or other reasons—is more
popular with physicians, and to determine whether answers to this question vary
significantly depending on the demographic and professional characteristics of
physicians. A qualitative approach could provide a narrative explanation of results; for
example, if the quantitative analysis reveals that physicians think that diagnostic software
is diagnostically useful but under used, then qualitative analysis could be an appropriate
means of determining why physicians do not use diagnostic software more frequently,
despite its utility. A quantitative approach was used in this study in order to obtain
necessary empirical insight into physicians’ attitudes towards diagnostic software, insight
that can be used to inform future quantitative as well as qualitative research. I used a
quantitative, cross-sectional approach in this study to examine whether physicians think
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there is a connection between diagnostic software used and misdiagnosis in a manner that
addressed some of the gaps in the literature noted in Chapter 2. More detail about the
method is provided in Chapter 3.
Theoretical Base
In order to explore the question of diagnostic software’s utility as a means of
reducing misdiagnosis, some theory capable of explaining the interface between
physicians and software is required. Accordingly, the first theoretical base for the study
centered on the theory of distributed cognition (Ajzen, 2005), which suggested that the
combination of humans and technology results in higher quality and more quickly
rendered decisions, as long as humans use technology with sufficient frequency and skill.
The theory of distributed cognition predicts that human decision-makers will employ
software or other technology to assist them when the benefits of doing so (in terms of the
quantity and quality of decisions) outweigh the costs (such as the emotional burdens of
delegating some aspects of decision-making to machines or feeling a loss of control or
expertise). These aspects of the theory of distributed cognition underlie the approach to
answering the research questions of this study. The second theoretical foundation for the
study is the theory of planned behavior, which was a specific model for explaining the
human component of a human-software system of distributed cognition (Ajzen, 2005;
Herath, 2010). The theory of planned behavior suggests that attitudinal perceptions of
usefulness or other kinds of benefit drive behavioral decisions such as software adoption;
the theory thus provides support for including diagnostic software adoption rates and
attitudes in the same model.
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Definition of Terms
Adoption of diagnostic software: As one of the independent variables of the study,
adoption of diagnostic software is a dichotomous variable with two levels: adoption and
non adoption.
Cognitive bias: A cognitive bias “is a generic defect in human reasoning based on
flawed methods of collecting, processing, or analyzing information” (Schwab, 2008, p.
23).
Computing: According to Woods and Woods (2000), “computing involves using
numbers to count, solve problems, and gather information” (p. 7). Computing is a method
of diagnosis or decision-making that is highly dependent on numerical analysis, and in
which decisions are reached only if quantifiably justified.
Diagnosis. Diagnosis refers to “the process of evaluating a patient’s medical
condition with the aim of choosing an appropriate treatment” (McPhee, Papadakis, &
Rabow, 2011. p. 56).
Diagnostic outcomes: As one of the dependent variables of the study, diagnostic
outcomes was a categorical variable measured on a Likert scale assessing the degree of
doctors’ agreement with the proposition that diagnostic software reduced misdiagnosis.
Distributed cognition: Distributed cognition is computation that is “part of the
larger system of decision-making” (Hazlehurst, Gorman, & McMullen, 2008, p. 11).
Thus, a doctor working to make a diagnosis with the help of his or her ratiocination, a
medical manual, and a software interface would be part of a three-component system of
distributed cognition.
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Intuition, sometimes referred to as experiential intuition, was defined by Duggan
(2005) in the following way:
[Decision-makers] study a situation (Step A), and the problem and solution come
to them at the same time (Step B). They think through the implications to arrive at
a course of action (Step C), and then commit to it, or reject it if they think it will
not work (Step D). In all four steps, they look for patterns of similarity and
difference with other situations they have lived or learned about. (p. 9)
There are many variant definitions of intuition, but, in this study, Duggan’s definition
will be used.
Planned behavior: Planned behavior is a model of human action in which,
according to Herath (2010), it is possible to “explain human actions by understanding the
following inputs and the interactions between them: Individual beliefs; collective beliefs;
beliefs about beliefs; and motivation” (p. 317). Planned behavior is thus a construct to
explain human actions that consists of elements of rationality, social determinism, and
classic behaviorism (Skinner, 1938). The planned behavior model (Herath, 2010) will be
explained further in Chapter 2.
Representativeness heuristic: The representativeness heuristic (or problemsolving method) is the form of “cognitive bias that bases decisions based on available
data rather than on all data, or at least a larger body of data” (Zilberberg, 2011, p. 69).
Thus, for example, a doctor who has treated four patients in a row who have the same
extremely rare disease might overestimate the actual prevalence of this disease among the
general population.
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Satisficing: Satisficing is a form of decision-making, sometimes employed by
doctors that was originated by Simon (1947) and defined by Garnham and Oakhill (1994)
as follows:
A satisficer recognizes that making the best decision is a time-consuming process,
and that the difference between a satisfactory decision and the best one will
probably not justify the effort of computing utilities. In satisficing, a criterion is
set for a satisfactory decision and the first alternative that meets that criterion is
accepted…Satisficing is a simpler procedure than computing and comparing
utilities, since the decision maker has simply to compare alternatives with the
criterion, as they are encountered (p. 186).
Software: Software consists of “lines of instruction, written in a computer
language, that direct a machine (or other software) to take a particular action” (Madhavji,
2006, p. 11).
Assumptions
One of the key assumptions of the study was that the results could be generalized,
applied, and would demonstrate significant value. Another key assumption in this study
was that doctors are able to introspect validly on the nature of their interaction with
technology. My third assumption of this study was that the participants in the survey
voluntarily provided honest responses to the best of their knowledge and understanding.
My final assumption of this study was that doctors who reply to the survey are
representative of non busy doctors rather than busy doctors.
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Limitations
The main limitation of this study was the small sample size. Physicians work
under intense time constraints and are difficult to recruit (Creswell, 2009). It is likely,
therefore, that the results are not highly generalizable to the entire population of
American doctors. Another limitation of the study was that only computer software
would be part of the study, as distinct from other forms of medical technology. This
limitation means that some aspects of the doctor-technology system of distributed
cognition were not examined.
Scope and Delimitations
This quantitative study involved the use of a web-based survey to collect data on
the relationship between the unchanged rates of misdiagnosis in the United States and the
use or nonuse of diagnostic software. I delimited the study to a randomly selected sub
population of 3,100 AMA-accredited, licensed, and practicing American doctors.
Significance of the Study
Given the human costs of misdiagnosis, the rising economic costs of healthcare,
and society’s increasing impatience with substandard medical treatment, the use of
diagnostic software represents a possible solution to both cost and efficiency problems
that are widely noted in the literature (Capps, Dranove, & Lindrooth, 2010; Skinner,
2011; Yong, Saunders, & Olsen, 2010). The fact that the prevalence of misdiagnosis has
remained high despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software requires further
analysis. This information can be useful to multiple stakeholders interested in improving
hospitals’ diagnostic performance, including healthcare policy-makers, hospital
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administrators, physicians, and software engineers. The social change implications of
such improvement are significant, as it can result in fewer patient deaths from
misdiagnosis and in this sense serve all patients reliant on accurate diagnosis for good
medical outcomes.
Summary and Transition
It is unlikely that the pressures on healthcare economics will ease in the near
future, especially as much of the developed world enters a period in which the majority of
its population will be aged and ill or under immediate threat of illness (Mankiw, 2011). It
is all the more necessary to understand why diagnostic accuracy has not substantially
improved, especially given that diagnoses are such an important predictor of the quality
and speed of subsequent healthcare (Simel & Rennie, 2008). In this study, I examined
whether physicians think there is a connection between diagnostic software use and
misdiagnosis.
Because healthcare costs are spiraling out of control all over the world (Krugman
& Wells, 2009; Mankiw 2011), any cost-efficient and feasible improvement in diagnostic
efficiency would be a welcome development, as such improvements lower the overall
cost of healthcare (Cleverly et al., 2010).
In Chapter 2 of this study, I present not only the review of the literature but also
the theoretical foundation for the study and link the literature to the key variables and
concepts. I build upon the foundation of theories and empirical studies that apply to
diagnostics in medicine, with a special emphasis on scholarly work about doctors’ and
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diagnostic software’s decision-making processes. I establish the need to research the
relationships between the independent and dependent variables in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Overview of the Literature Review
The purpose of this study was to draw upon physician-provided data to determine
why, at least in physicians’ opinions, the prevalence of misdiagnosis has remained high
despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software. The problem addressed in the
study was the prevalence of high levels of misdiagnosis (Leavitt & Leavitt, 2011) despite
an adoption rate for diagnostic software that is between 55 and 70% (Chernick, 2011;
Felder & Mayrhofer, 2011). Throughout the literature, authors have suggested that
diagnostic software does indeed have the ability to both assist physicians with their
diagnoses and to provide sound diagnoses in its own right in a manner that will be
examined later in the chapter. The questions that do not appear to be addressed in the
literature are whether physicians are using diagnostic software frequently and expertly
enough to avail themselves of its benefits.
Literature Search Strategy
In order to investigate what previous literature has stated about this topic,
searches for medical misdiagnosis, diagnostic software, diagnostic technology, physician
opinions and diagnostic software, and distributed cognition in healthcare were conducted
on the EBSCO Host, Science Direct, Google Scholar, and ProQuest databases. Older
literature was included in the literature review because there are seminal theories of
diagnosis and diagnostic technology. The extensive literature on the utility, or lack of
utility, of diagnostic software exemplifies how the search strings and associated review of
studies disclosed the existence of only a few studies (for example, Dreiseitl, 2005) that
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drew on a sample of physicians to answer the question of why misdiagnosis remains so
prevalent despite the sophistication and widespread adoption of diagnostic technology.
The Science of Diagnosis
The Oxford English Dictionary (2011) defined diagnosis as the “determination of
the nature of a diseased condition; identification of a disease by careful investigation of
its symptoms and history; also, the opinion (formally stated) resulting from such
investigation” (para. 1). Diagnosis has Greek roots; in ancient Greek, the roots are “διαthrough, thoroughly, asunder + γιγνώσκειν to learn to know, perceive” (Oxford English
Dictionary). Thus, diagnosis suggests the acquisition of thorough knowledge.
In the Western medical tradition, the first great study of medicine was the
Hippocratic Corpus (Kelly, 2010), the name given to the collected writings of
Hippocrates (an ancient Greek physician, known as the father of medicine, who lived
from 460 B.C.E. to 370 B.C.E.). The Hippocratic Corpus, over 70 medical treatises
written by Hippocrates or his students in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C.E., is the earliest
surviving and scientific discussion of diagnostic science (Renouard, 2010), and is,
therefore, an appropriate starting point for any discussion of diagnostics. According to
Hippocrates, diagnosis has the following components: (a) gathering of evidence,
including physical evidence and verbal evidence (gathered from speaking to the patient)
pertaining to a patient’s symptoms; (b) fitting knowledge about the symptoms to a
specific disease, whether known or postulated; (c) determining the most appropriate
treatment for the disease; and (d) fine-tuning the treatment based on ongoing observations
of the interaction between the patient and the proposed treatment. This process is
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discussed at length in “On Regimen in Acute Diseases,” when Hippocrates (Adams,
1849), writing in the 5th century BCE, used the word diagnosis for the first time in
writing (p. 282). Adams, who provided a translation of the Hippocratic Corpus in 1849,
argued that Hippocrates’ model of diagnosis remained highly influential: “Hippocrates
and his followers…in a great measure anticipated all the results of modern diagnosis” (p.
307).
One of the revolutions in diagnostic science in the age of contemporary medicine
was the study, analysis, and categorization of a vast number of diseases, which scientists
were often able to understand on a molecular and genetic level (Bynum, 2008; Cunha,
2011). The vast accumulation of knowledge of disease meant that, over time, the
diagnostic process became oriented to fitting observed symptoms to already-known
diseases; after all, by the end of the end of the 20th century, the variations of disease were
comprehensively understood, and the task of diagnosticians focused on fitting symptoms
to disease (Hodler, Schulthess, & Zolikofer, 2011).
Hippocrates (as cited in Adams, 1849), for his part, placed equal emphasis on
observed symptoms and grand etiological theories that were intended to explain the
ultimate origins of disease. This emphasis steadily fell away by the Middle Ages. Hersen
and Thomas (2006) described the key post-Hippocratic developments in diagnostic
science as follows:
Throughout the classical era, diagnoses were made based on presumed etiology,
as when Hippocrates rooted the illnesses he diagnosed (mania, melancholia, and
paranoia) in various imbalances of black bile, yellow bile, blood, and
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phlegm…Basing diagnostic assessments on such etiologic conceits changed only
when the Swiss physician and natural philosopher Paracelsus (1490-1541)
developed the concept of syndromal diagnosis. Paracelsus defined the syndrome
as a group of signs and symptoms that co-occur in a common pattern and thereby,
presumably, characterize a particular abnormality or disease state, but for which
etiology is unknown, perhaps unknowable. Syndromal diagnosis is epitomized
today in the DSM, which continues its focus on the signs and symptoms of
diseases, rather than presumed etiologies, which are unnecessary for diagnostic
purposes (p. 4).
As Hensen and Thomas (2006) wrote from the perspective of psychology and
psychiatry, their reference to the DSM—the abbreviation for the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—does not apply to all of medicine. However, the
concept of syndromal diagnosis and the accompanying importance of evidence-based,
empirical pattern recognition and fitting symptoms to diseases do indeed characterize the
entire tradition of modern Western medicine, also known as biomedicine (Hughes, 2011).
Of course, it is not necessary to agree, along with Hensen and Thomas, that Hippocrates’s
emphasis on etiology, or the study of the causes of diseases, lessened the importance of
the Hippocratic practice of diagnosis and symptom fitting. Robson and Baek (2009)
argued that Hippocrates’s belief in no etiological concepts (such as the belief that the
color and volume of bodily fluids determined aspects of personality) should not distract
attention from the remarkably modern paradigm of Hippocratic diagnosis. Hess,
MacIntyre, and Mishoe (2011) pointed out that Hippocrates’s diagnosis of digital
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clubbing could stand alongside modern examples of sound diagnosis. Regardless of the
role of etiology, the next steps in diagnostic science are straightforward. After fitting
symptoms to a disease, the diagnostic authority either administers or recommends the
administration of some treatment (Carpenito-Moyet, 2008).
There are many kinds of treatments, including pharmacological treatments,
surgery, and other interventions (such as radiation; Foster, 2010). Whatever the precise
composition of a treatment, the next and final stage in the diagnostic model is to monitor
what happens to the patient so that a treatment can be modified if necessary or carried
through to the termination of a patient’s symptoms (Monahan, Neighbors, & Green,
2010).
For example, the post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnostic guidelines
contain reference material on which a human doctor or diagnostic software could draw to
make a diagnosis of PTSD. In this case, for a diagnosis of PTSD to be reached, the
patient has to present with a specific set of symptoms spread across criteria A-F as shown
in Table 1. However, even though PTSD is a highly studied disease with a known
etiology and biological mechanisms (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), there is
still room for ambiguity and discretion in making this diagnosis based on the diagnostic
guidelines for PTSD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 256) in Table 1.
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Table 1
DSM Criteria for PTSD
Criterion

Description

A: Stressor

The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following have been present:
(1)The person has experienced, witnessed, or been confronted with an event or events that involve
actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of oneself or others.
(2) The person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror. Note: in children, it may be
expressed instead by disorganized or agitated behavior.

B:Intrusive
Recollection

The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in at least one of the following ways:
(1) Recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, thoughts, or
perceptions. Note: in young children, repetitive play may occur in which themes or aspects of the
trauma are expressed. (2) Recurrent distressing dreams of the event. Note: in children, there may be
frightening dreams without recognizable content. (3) Acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were
recurring (includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative
flashback episodes, including those that occur upon awakening or when intoxicated). Note: in
children, trauma-specific reenactment may occur. (4) Intense psychological distress at exposure to
internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event. (5) Physiologic
reactivity upon exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the
traumatic event

C:Avoidant /
Numbing

Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness
(not present before the trauma), as indicated by at least three of the following: (1) Efforts to avoid
thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma. (2) Efforts to avoid activities, places,
or people that arouse recollections of the trauma. (3) Inability to recall an important aspect of the
trauma. (4) Markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities. (5) Feeling of
detachment or estrangement from others. (6) Restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving
feelings). (7) Sense of foreshortened future (e.g., does not expect to have a career, marriage,
children, or a normal life span).

D:HyperArousal

Persistent symptoms of increasing arousal (not present before the trauma), indicated by at least two
of the following: (1) Difficulty falling or staying asleep. (2) Irritability or outbursts of anger. (3)
Difficulty concentrating. (4) Hyper-vigilance. (5) Exaggerated startle response.

E: Duration

Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in B, C, and D) is more than one month.

F: Functional
Significance

The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning. Acute: if duration of symptoms is less than three months; Chronic: if
duration of symptoms is three months or more.

Specify if:

With or Without delay onset: Onset of symptoms at least six months after the stressor.

Note. Adapted from American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual
of mental disorders, fourth edition, text revision. Washington, D.C.: American
Psychiatric Association, (2000, p. 256).

According to the American Psychiatric Association, at least two of the following
five symptoms should be present in a PTSD-diagnosed patient: “(a) Difficulty falling or
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staying asleep, (b) Irritability or outbursts of anger, (c) Difficulty concentrating, (d)
Hyper-vigilance, (e) Exaggerated startle response” (p. 256). However, there are cases of
patients with PTSD who have exhibited only one of these symptoms (American
Psychiatric Association, p. 256). This example shows the potential inexactitude of
diagnostic science, regardless of the revolutionary advances that have occurred in
medicine since the time of Hippocrates.
One of the problems of diagnosis is that patients can be radically different from
each other, and therefore diseases can manifest themselves in different ways in different
patients (Winkelman, 2008). However, diagnostic science is not designed to
accommodate variation but rather to look for generalities and laws (Winkelman, 2008).
Thus, as in the American Psychiatric Association’s (2000) discussion of the symptoms of
PTSD, statistical generalities have to be used in order to construct a portrait of the most
common type of PTSD patient. In real life, PTSD patients might not conveniently display
the symptoms that other patients have had, but they might suffer from PTSD all the same.
Thus, in diagnostic science, there is a constant pull between the academic need to reach
general conclusions about disease contrasted with the practical necessity of remembering
that patients and their symptoms can be highly idiosyncratic (Winkelman, 2008).
The way of diagnostic science presented thus far in the literature review is what
Lock and Nguyen (2011) called the consensus view of biomedicine. However, there are
other views as well. Some scholars, for instance, have tried to argue that the diagnostic
process is not merely a kind of science but also a cultural practice that is laden with
inherent social values. Byrne (2012) offered a powerful recent articulation of this point of
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view: “Social construction recognizes that disease is not merely a biological fact but is an
artifact of social interpretation. Diseases have meanings. Homosexuality used to be
considered a disease; catching a cold and catching herpes are somehow different” (pp. 23). According to Byrne 2012; Freidson 1970; Schneider and Conrad 1981 who
emphasize the social construction of disease, there is temptation to think of diagnostic
science as somehow distinct from the society in which it takes place. However, there is a
strong argument to be made that, because the concept of disease is itself fluid and
culturally relative, so too diagnostic science should be fluid. Fadiman’s (1998) booklength account of the diagnosis of a child of Hmong ethnicity in California chronicles the
value-laden nature of Western medicine, or biomedicine, when it comes into conflict with
other traditions of belief and medicine. While issues of social construction will not be
considered in this study, it is nonetheless important to be aware of the limits of diagnostic
science.
The science of diagnosis as it is understood in contemporary times can, relying on
the authorities whose work was discussed above, be summarized as follows. Diagnosis
begins with some form of evidence collection, typically relying on a combination of
physical evidence (such as a patient’s blood) and the patient’s own subjective and
phenomenological accounts of illness, some of which can be overlaid with social and
cultural values. This evidence is then synthesized into a set of symptoms, that is,
observable problems and abnormalities. Next, the diagnostician moves toward fitting the
symptoms to a known disease and consults some established authority—including
personal experience of past patients’ symptoms, current analysis of an individual
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patient’s symptoms, or a reference guide (such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders or diagnostic textbooks that address specific fields such as
autoimmune disease, musculoskeletal disease, or other areas)—to decide upon a suitable
form of treatment. Finally, the patient is monitored to determine whether the chosen
treatment is proving to be effective, or whether further modifications to the treatment
plan are needed. With this nutshell definition of the scientific process in diagnosis serving
as a foundation, it is possible to try to theoretically model what is known of diagnostics.
A Brief Overview of American Healthcare: Diagnostic Issues
Diagnosis is a process that is driven by the kinds of diseases with which a
population is faced. In the United States, the most common terminal diseases are listed in
Table 2 (Centers for Disease Control, 2012, p. 3); these diseases are more commonly
diagnosed than, for example, the kinds of infectious diseases that are more prevalent in
the Global South.
Table 2
Main Leading Causes of Death in the U.S.
Causes of death
Heart disease
Cancer
Stroke or cerebrovascular disease
Chronic lower respiratory illness
Accidents or unintentional injuries
Alzheimer’s disease
Diabetes
Influenza and pneumonia
Nephritis or nephrosis
Septicemia

Annual victims
616,067
562,875
135,952
127,924
123,706
74,632
71,382
52,717
46,448
41,144

Note. Adapted from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Death and Mortality.
NCHS Web site.http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/deaths.htm. Accessed May 20, 2012
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Thus, as can be seen from Table 2, the most common diagnoses in the United
States are for heart disease and cancer. Overall, medical scholars have argued that the
United States is a classic example of a developed country in which there has been a shift
in the burden of disease, away from infectious diseases to so-called lifestyle diseases
(Caperchione, Kolt, & Mummery, 2009). Whereas 19th-century Americans were
routinely killed by infections, Americans now tend to die because of health problems that
emerge from a highly sedentary and inactive national lifestyle (Edlin & Golanty, 2009).
Thus, the vast majority of cases that present to American doctors have to do with heart
disease, cancer, and other diseases that have come to predominate in the developed world
(Edlin & Golanty, 2009).
There is currently no national clearinghouse of data for American diagnostic
statistics. However, different sources in the literature offer insight into the state of
American diagnostics. The outlook is decidedly mixed in terms of the quality and
timeliness of diagnostic decisions. The New York City Comptroller, Liu (2011) released
a report indicating that many New York City hospitals had what the comptroller called
“dangerously long waiting times” (para. 1) for diagnostic mammograms. In one New
York City hospital, the average wait for a diagnostic mammogram in 2011 was 50
working days (Liu, 2011). Given that there are tens of thousands of discrete diagnostic
procedures and many thousands of hospitals in the United States, it is not possible to
offer an overview of the national healthcare system’s diagnostic efficiency; however,
some general conclusions can still be reached. In his report on mammogram waiting
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times, Liu noted that the healthcare system of New York City was characterized by wide
disparities in the speed of diagnosis; while one hospital in the Queens borough took 50
working days to order diagnostic mammograms, there were other hospitals and clinics in
New York City where this procedure could be ordered and completed in a single day
(Liu, 2011).
The conclusion is that the American healthcare system is highly variable with
respect to diagnostic efficiency. One trend is that publicly-funded hospitals, especially
hospitals in urban centers, are perpetually under budget pressure and have developed
dysfunctional operational cultures, resulting in the long-delayed diagnoses noted by Liu
(2011) and other observers (Trautman, 2011). Another trend is that wealthier Americans
are able to opt out of bottom-tier care by hiring concierge doctors, purchasing better
health insurance policies, and patronizing private clinics (Stillman, 2010). For this
reason, there are wide disparities in the quality and timeliness of diagnostic procedures
depending on the hospital, the precise diagnostic procedure, and the city in which
services are provided. These disparities are far less pronounced in countries with robust
public medicine programs; in the United Kingdom, for example, wait times for medical
diagnostic procedures are essentially standardized so that anyone who attends a
healthcare facility associated with the National Health Service (NHS) can expect to
receive diagnoses in the same timeframe, and of the same quality, regardless of which
healthcare facility is chosen (Dimakou, Parkin, Devlin, & Appleby, 2010).
The main conclusion to be drawn is that in the United States, diagnosis of disease
is not only a scientific process but also a market phenomenon that is affected by the
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American healthcare financing system and various market pressures. For example, recent
years have seen the rise of the phenomenon of diagnostic outsourcing, in which
physicians in another country—India is a popular destination, given the rigor of medical
education and language commonalities—are paid to diagnose diseases by looking at xrays and other forms of patient data (Schneirdjans, Schneirdjans, & Schneirdjans, 2007).
The purpose of this brief overview of some diagnostic trends and issues in
American healthcare has been to offer a context for some of the implications that will be
drawn, and recommendations that will be advanced in Chapter 5. Clearly, diagnostic
processes are part of a larger market system, and recommendations about how diagnostic
processes can be improved ought to be grounded in an acknowledgement of that reality.
A Theoretical Model of Diagnosis
In order to think more deeply about what diagnosis is, how it functions, and how
it might vary depending on whether the diagnostician is a doctor or software, it is
necessary to suggest and defend a more general theory of diagnosis. First, diagnosis
appears to be a high-level cognitive skill. Additionally, because diagnosis is the basis for
some form of intervention in the physical world (such as the administration of a drug or
the initiation of a surgery), it also has a component of action. Formally speaking,
diagnosis is what Linehan (1993) called cognitive-verbal behavior, which “includes such
activities as thinking, problem solving, perceiving, imaging, speaking, writing, and
gestural communication” (p. 17), all of which are activities that have been shown to be
inalienable parts of the diagnostic process (Foster, 2010; Hess, MacIntyre, & Mishoe,
2011; Hughes, 2011). It makes sense, therefore, that a theoretical model of cognitive-
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verbal behavior could also serve as a theoretical model of diagnosis itself. One promising
model of behavior is the planned behavior model of Herath (2010). The planned behavior
model as a five-stage model of what goes on between the formation of a diagnostic belief
and the transformation of that belief into actual diagnostic behavior, such as the issuance
of a prescription recommendation as shown in Table 3.
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Table 3
Five Levels of Herath’s (2010) Planned Behavior Model
Level

Description

Relation to
other levels

1

1a Behavioral beliefs: Beliefs formed by the individual out of a personal
process of rational, purposive thinking.

1a leads to 2a;
1b leads to 2b;
1c leads to 2c

1b Normative beliefs: Beliefs considered normal; highly accepted beliefs
within a culture or sub-culture.
1c Control beliefs: Beliefs about beliefs (for example, judgments about the
soundness of a belief)
2

2a Attitudes: Attitudes are more concrete beliefs; they imply some
intention to act in a certain way.

2a, 2b, and 2c all
lead to 3a.

2b Subjective norms: Subjective norms are the collective knowledge of
authority (for example, a medical manual).
2c Perceived behavioral control: An individual’s belief about his or her
ability to control and direct her beliefs.
3

3a Behavioral intention: A disposition to act in a particular way.

3a interacts with
4a and 4b and
leads to 5

4

4a Intrinsic motivation: A desire to act in a particular way based on
personal reasons.

4a and 4b are
variables that
mediate or
moderate between
3a and 5a, and
also between 2a,
2b, 2c and 3a

4b Extrinsic motivation: A desire to act in a particular way based on
external, non-personal reasons.

5

5a Actual behavior

Outcome of
previous levels

Note. Synthesized from Eliciting Salient Beliefs are Critical to Predict Behavioural
Change in Theory of Planned Behavior Herath (2010).
Table 3 offers more detail on what these five levels are and how they interact; it
should be noted that the descriptions of each level are broad paraphrases of Herath (2010)
that have been modified to account specifically for diagnosis (for example, medical
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manuals were given as an example of subjective norms, an example that does not appear
in Herath’s own discussion of the model. The Planned Behavior Model has the
advantages of strength, flexibility, and alignment with the existing literature on diagnosis.
It also addresses a question that the model of distributed cognition does not, which is
exactly how the human components of decision-making work within a broader welter of
influences from society, the individual mind, and the environment (which includes
diagnostic software). The only potentially complex aspect of the model is the role of
motivation. Herath argued that, in previous versions of the Planned Behavior Model
(such as the seminal version of the model created by Ajzen, 2005), researchers had failed
to take adequate account of the role of motivation. In order words, according to Herath,
researchers assumed that behavioral intentions—formed by the inputs in levels 1 and 2 of
Table3—led straightforwardly to actual behavior (as was the case in Ajzen’s original
model). However, Herath argued that motivation was an important intermediate variable.
This point can be illustrated by means of an example. Even if a doctor were to arrive at a
behavioral intention to diagnose a particular drug as a result of beliefs and attitudes that
strongly supported the prescription of that drug, a powerful kind of motivation—for
example, the doctor’s knowledge of, and guilt about, the fact that a previous patient on
the same drug died—could cause the doctor to revise and reject the rational process of
attitude formation. Thus, by making an accommodation for the role of motivation,
Herath’s Planned Behavior Model can accommodate both rational and irrational
behavior. Herath’s Planned Behavioral Model also provides an underpinning for one of
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the independent variables of the study, the use of diagnostic software, by grounding the
decision to use such software in a rationalistic framework of choice.
Before examining how the Planned Behavior Model accommodates existing
features of diagnostic science, a few further points about the model ought to be made. To
begin with, variations of this model are often used to analyze patients’ intentions to adopt
health behaviors (Reneman, Geertzen, Groothoff, & Brouwer, 2008). However, as Herath
(2010) pointed out, the Planned Behavior Model is population-agnostic, and can be
applied to any human decision-making process. Second, it is also often the case that the
Planned Behavior Model is used to model behavior that will take place weeks, months, or
even years in the future (Li, Frieze, & Tang, 2010). However, the Planned Behavior
Model can be applied to any decision that takes place more than a few seconds after the
initial stimulus (Herath, 2010). Thus, the ways in which the Planned Behavior Model has
historically been used in medical research should not be taken as limitations of the model
itself. Having explained why the model might be useful to researchers interested in
diagnostic behavior, it is natural to offer more detail on how and why the Planned
Behavior Model fits with diagnostic science. Such a discussion, while being useful in its
own right, will also serve as a foundation for a discussion of differences between human
and machine diagnosis.
In order to understand how the Planned Behavior Model is a good description of
what takes place in diagnosis, and thereby to set the stage for understanding how human
and machine diagnosis are different, consider that diagnosis itself can be broken into
three components: computation, satisficing, and intuition. In this section of the literature
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review, each of these components will be discussed on their own, after which the
components’ relevance to the Planned Behavior Model will be discussed in a separate
section.
Computation
Computation at its most basic level can be understood as the use of mathematical
processes to arrive at an output from an input (Berstein, 2011). There are two widely
recognized forms of computation. In the mathematical model of computation, an input is
transformed via a function; once the initial input is given, there are no additional steps,
and the input and output are distinct from each other. In the engineering model of
computation, inputs and outputs can be entangled, such that they interact with each other,
and the computation is revised accordingly (Meyers, 2011). In terms of outputs
themselves, computations have two forms: They can be closed and exhaustive, or they
can have a confidence level. For example, the computation that 2 + 2 = 4 is a closed and
exhaustive computation; the degree of certainty that the output follows from the inputs is
absolute (Adam, 2011). An example of a kind of computation that is based on a
confidence level is a forecast based on a Poisson distribution (Babu, 2011). For example,
if one tries to forecast how many red cars will arrive at a stop sign based on previous
observations of the sign, the forecast will always be an estimate; statistical methods can
be used to indicate how much confidence researchers should have in the forecast.
As it can be imagined, computation in medical diagnosis tends toward confidence
levels rather than absolutely certainty (Chernick, 2011). It is hardly ever the case that
doctors think of a particular set of symptoms as absolutely indicative of a certain disease;
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because of the complexity of disease, the fallibility of the process of matching symptoms
to diseases, and other unforeseen variables—such as patients who lie about their
symptoms—doctors prefer not to think of diagnoses as being absolutely certain or
uncertain (First & Tasman, 2011). Additionally, because diagnosis contains a built-in
process of monitoring and, if necessary, adjusting the treatment, diagnosis can be thought
as a kind of engineering computation rather than as a kind of mathematical computation
(McGann & Hutson, 2011).
Thus, having set aside mathematical computation, closed calculations, and
absolute certainty as concepts that apply infrequently to medical diagnosis (Chernick,
2011; First & Tasman, 2011; McGann & Hutson, 2011), it would be useful to spend more
time understanding how confidence levels and engineering computation function in
diagnostic science. How, then, does computation function in diagnosis science? To begin
with, the treatment (alongside the symptoms) should be thought of as the input, and the
result as the output. Doctors wish to be as certain as they can be that a particular input
will lead to the output of wellness (Nuttall & Rutt-Howard, 2011), however it is defined
(e.g., cessation of symptoms, patient’s self-reported health, etc.). In the process of
computation, then, the goal of the doctor is to be as sure as possible that the input of
treatment leads to the output of health (Bath-Hextall, Lymn, & Knaggs, 2011). The
problem is: How can the doctor find the most appropriate input?
In computational terms, one solution to the problem is what is known as a
decision tree. In a decision tree, the computing system—whether it is a human, a
computer, or a human using a computer—works through all of the available forking paths
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on an if-then basis: That is, calculating if a particular decision is taken, what will its
utility be? (Bekkerman, Bilenko, & Langford, 2011). Chess computers provide a simple
example of decision trees. In deciding how to make a chess move, chess computers
employ decision trees to calculate the respective costs and benefits of all available moves,
or as many moves as the computer’s central processing unit (CPU) can model. Current
supercomputers can calculate the costs and benefits of trillions of moves in just a few
seconds (Nielsen, 2011). Of course, calculations of this sort are based on a confidence
level; there is no one right move, but rather a move that is rated higher than other moves
(Lefrancois, 2011).
In the world of the physician, one use of the computational decision tree is to
match observed symptoms to any number of diseases that could fit the symptoms. In
some cases, such a decision tree might be small; for example, some patients have
symptoms that are highly typical of a handful of diseases, prompting the doctor to take a
closer look at those diseases and their possible connection to the symptoms (Clavien &
Trotter, 2011). In other cases, a symptom could be typical of hundreds, or even
thousands, of known diseases (Reiss, Shadomy, & Lyon, 2011). In such a case, a socalled brute force computational approach would be to examine every one of the possible
diseases for further evidence of matching symptoms; in the actual practice of medicine,
however, it is more common for doctors to collect more data that can narrow down the
number of diseases with which a symptom might be associated (Gifford, 2011).
One interesting computational study was that of Martin, Perez, and Muller’s
(2009), which analyzed the role of Bayesian statistics in medical decision-making. As
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Martin et al. pointed out, diagnosing a disease can be highly dependent on when a patient
is examined, and when particular data is collected from the patient. According to Martin
et al., some diseases progress in a more or less random fashion, meaning that more
regular sampling of a patient’s condition might be necessary to reach a proper diagnosis.
On the other hand, some diseases proceed in an almost linear fashion, creating urgency
for the doctor to move from the process of gathering evidence to the process of
administering a treatment to effect a cure. Martin et al. argued that there is an obvious
computational role for diagnostic software that can accurately estimate, on behalf of a
doctor, when data should be gathered from a patient, and calculate the significance of
gathered data. Martin et al.’s discussion emphasized the rising importance of statistical
analysis in modern medicine, and argued that software performs more accurately than
doctors in determining when patients should be monitored for particular diseases. As
Martin et al., argued, even if physicians perform this kind of statistical analysis
themselves, the act of doing so might deplete valuable time and energy that the physician
needs for more cure-oriented actions. Thus, Martin et al. concluded that there appears to
be a clear role for diagnostic software in making statistical calculations about when to
gather patient data, and deciding the statistical significance of the gathered data.
Whereas Martin et al. (2009) discussed the specific computational utility of
diagnostic software at a specific stage of diagnosis (evidence collection), Schwab (2008)
made a more general point about the advantages of computation that has to do with
heuristics, which is defined as “a method of solving problems that puts aside belief in
things like causality and argumentation from the known to the unknown” (Bowman &
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Frega, 2012, p. 348). In an article about the limits of medical decision-making, Schwab
pointed out that “human judgment is governed by generally expedient heuristics (a
flipped coin will come up heads half the time) that lead to predictable biases (people
expect a flipped coin to land heads, then tails, then heads, then tails, etc.)” (p. 1861).
Doctors are not immune to what Schwab called the heuristics and biases theory of
decision-making. The heart of the problem is that, as Schwab put it, human psychology is
committed to “sense-making processes” (p. 1865). All humans have some bias toward the
need for events, actions, and behaviors to make sense. Computation does not have this
bias; it is agnostic to the various decision-making fallacies enumerated by Schwab. Thus,
in addition to serving the kind of positive utility described by Martin et al., it is also
possible that computation as it applies to diagnostic decision-making has a negative
utility: By rooting diagnosis in statistics, computation prevents doctors from committing
cognitive errors related to the innate human desire for sense and meaning.
Another discussion of the fallibility of physician decision-making and the
superiority of the computational approach appeared in Gorini and Pravettoni’s (2011)
recent article on cognitive bias in the diagnostic process. Goritni and Pravettoni identified
two important flaws in physician decision-making; heuristic bias (which was also
discussed by Schwab, 2008) and under-reliance on the statistical likelihood of disease:
…physicians often use [representative heuristics] to match symptoms of the
patient against prototypes or mental templates of diagnoses. However, relying on
the representativeness heuristic can lead a diagnostician to only look at and search
for the prototypical manifestations of a disease. This can lead to an incorrect or
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delayed diagnosis when aspects of a patient's presentation are atypical. In some
instances, the reliance on the representativeness heuristic leads to a ‘base-rate
neglect’. Base-rate neglect includes the failure to adequately take into account the
prevalence of a particular disease. When the true prevalence of a disease is
ignored, it may lead to the overestimation of improbable diagnoses, which, in
turn, is disadvantageous for the patient and can result in an over-utilization of
resources (p. 548).
Because diagnostic calculation is probabilistic, diagnostic software programs do
not succumb to the representativeness heuristic; as will be discussed later in the literature
review, software programs offer likelihoods, not certainties, and computation cannot be
misled by the motivation to fit symptoms to diseases in a particular and biased way.
Additionally, because computation is non-emotional reasoning, relying on diagnostic
computations is warranted when either physicians are trying to get an idea of the
likelihood of a disease, quite apart from how the patient or the physician would feel about
seeing a diagnosis revealed as accurate or inaccurate. For these reasons, the software
engineers Gorini and Pravettoni (2011) defended the use of diagnostic software and other
forms of computational decision-making in the diagnostic context.
On the other hand, as Bucknall (2010) argued in a recent article on the nature of
medical error in emergency diagnoses, computation also has its limits. According to
Bucknall, “80% of medical error results from system flaws” (p. 152), with the system
defined as the sum of human, machine, and process inputs. Thus, for example, it is of
little use to employ diagnostic software to indicate the best blood sampling times to test
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for a certain disease when the patient cannot be reached by the hospital, or has not been
directed to follow up. One of the implications of Bucnkall’s argument is that, while
diagnostic software is excellent at computational tasks, these tasks in themselves do not
significantly reduce the innate risk of medical error, because they take place within an
existing system. If that system is flawed, then so is the utility of diagnostic software. At
the same time, Bucknall argued that the value of doctors lies in their ability to step
outside a flawed system, a quality that Bucknall considered an extremely important
component of diagnostic success in emergency medicine in particular. Another
implication of Bucknall’s work is that a physician’s knowledge of certain aspects of
diagnostic software, one of the independent variables of the study, can affect the ultimate
efficacy of diagnostic software.
Another limitation of computation is that computation becomes more complicated
once a decision tree has already been generated and followed to a conclusion (Segal &
Shahar, 2009). For example, if a doctor has used computational methods to identify six
diseases with which a symptom might be compatible, there are diminishing returns to
further computation. At some point, doctors might not be able to reduce the possible
number of symptom-matching diseases; in addition to the obvious limitations on time that
exist in many diagnostic environments (such as an emergency room in a busy urban
environment), evidence itself is limited (Croskerry, Cosby, & Schenkel, & Wears, 2008).
When a doctor runs out of tests and other diagnostic aids, and is still left with a handful
of diseases that match the patient’s symptoms, other diagnostic skills have to be called
upon. One of these skills is known as satisficing.
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Satisficing
To return to the previous example, imagine that a doctor has identified six
diseases with which a given patient’s symptoms are consistent, and that there is no
further use for computational roles in determining precisely what disease the patient
might be suffering from. What can a doctor do? Garnham and Oakhill (1994) provided
one possible answer as follows: The doctor, following the principle of satisficing, could
simply choose the first diagnostic alternative that met a specified criterion, such as
accounting for a highly important symptom.
A doctor starting with a list of six diseases that are equally likely to be responsible
for a given set of symptoms could thus resort to satisficing by administering a treatment
for a single disease and watching the result (Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011). The initial
treatment would be guided by the use of bounded rationality, meaning that the physician
would apply his or her existing knowledge to narrow down the possible choices for
treatment (Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011). If the treatment for that disease resulted in a
cessation of the symptoms, then the doctor might assume that the diagnostic process had
been successful (Groopman, 2007). The choice of which disease to try to treat first is
driven by any number of considerations. For example, a doctor could try to treat the
disease that was the most life threatening or that required the earliest intervention. If all
of the diseases compatible with a patient’s symptoms were equal in their danger, then the
doctor might randomly choose one of the diseases to try to treat (Montgomery, 2006).
Satisficing is, in its way, a kind of experimentation. If the experimentation is
successful, the diagnostic process is over—especially in a medical atmosphere in which
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there is extreme pressure on doctors to achieve results and move on to the next patient
(Schwartz & Bergus, 2008). If the experimentation is unsuccessful, however, then
satisficing can lead back into computation. It was noted earlier in the literature review
that the engineering model of computation assumes an ongoing interaction between
inputs and outputs. If a satisficing doctor noticed that a particular treatment failed to
result in a cessation of symptoms, but gave rise to a new piece of medical evidence, then
the computation process could begin again, as the doctor tried to fit new symptoms to a
disease set (Shaw, Ramachandra, Lucas, & Robinson, 2011). What is more common,
however, is for doctors to try treatments in turn until they observe cessation of symptoms
(Felder & Mayrhofer, 2011). Thus, it can be argued that the goal of medical computation
is to lower the number of possible fits between symptom and disease—ideally, to 1 (that
is, a unique fit), but sometimes to 2-6 fits, in which the doctor works through different
possibilities in an experimental manner (Rao, 2007).
Satisficing has its weaknesses, among them the lack of diagnostic precision
(Zilberberg, 2011), but also its strengths. One of the strengths of satisficing is the selfcorrecting nature of the practice (Simon, 1947). When doctors observe that a diagnosis
reached through satisficing is incorrect, they move on pragmatically, factoring other
knowledge into their diagnostic decisions and subjecting their earlier decisions to more
critical scrutiny, achieving what Ryan (2010) called reflective inquiry, and what other
scholars call, more generically, metacognition (Mamede, Rikers, & Schmidt, 2012).
Satisficing, while proven to be a common tool in the diagnostic arsenal, has
limitations. Sometimes, especially in emergencies, a doctor might lack the time or the
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means to try several treatments; at other times, a patient might be too fragile to endure
several treatments in succession. In cases of this kind, doctors often rely on a third kind
of diagnostic skill: Intuition.
Intuition
Duggan (2005) defined intuition, as it functions for expert and scientifically
minded decision makers, as a form of decision-making based on “patterns of similarity
and difference with other situations” (p. 9) experienced by the decision-maker. Intuition
can be understood as a specific form of physician knowledge not easily rendered into
diagnostic rules.
The popular understanding of intuition is that of a sixth sense or some other
pseudo-mystical capability. However, as Duggan pointed out, intuition as it functions
among scientific decision-makers are not mystical or frivolous, but rather a diagnostic
skill rooted in experience. Such experiences can be highly idiosyncratic and resistant to
computational analysis (Kattan & Cowen, 2009). For example, doctors might have noted
that many past patients in a particular situation reacted to a particular drug with toxic
shock, and might thus assume that a current patient in the same situation would respond
in the same way. The medical literature is replete with examples of intuition as a
diagnostic skill (Chapman & Sonnenberg, 2003; Flynn & Van Schaik, 2003; Plessner,
Betsch, & Betsch, 2008). Intuition is often the last diagnostic computation, one that
comes after computation has been exhausted and satisficing is impossible or deemed too
risky (Flynn & Van Schaik, 2003).
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Intuition has another important role in diagnostic science. It also serves as the
form of introspection that affords doctors a stronger belief in their beliefs, and that leads
doctors to rely on the received wisdom of medical manuals and the pooled knowledge of
their profession (Groopman, 2007). In this way, intuition—in combination with
computation and satisficing—can be directly related to the Planned Behavior Model of
Herath (2010).
Recent literature on intuition in medical decision-making has called attention to
some unique strengths of the human touch. For example, McDermott (2008) pointed out
that there were many variables in whether or not a patient would accept and comply with
a specific treatment plan for a diagnosed disease, including “the way treatment options
are framed and presented” (p. 665) by the doctor and “denial mechanisms” (p. 665). As
McDermott argued, diagnostic decisions require patient compliance to be successful.
Take the case of a patient whom the diagnosing doctor knows to have a particular bias:
For example, a reluctance to take a medicine that is injected into the bloodstream. In this
kind of case, diagnostic software would not know which of the available treatments to, as
it were, pitch to the patient; the doctor’s knowledge of patient context, and skill at
framing, are required to achieve compliance. Sometimes this aspect of the doctor’s skill
is not based on a direct judgment about the patient’s compliance, but becomes an innate
quality built out of thousands of clinical encounters (McDermott, 2008). Software
designers are striving towards the ability to build a kind of intuition into software using
expert systems, although, in the context of this study, it remains to be seen what doctors
think of such systems.
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Computation, Satisficing, Intuition, and the Planned Behavior Model
The planned behavior model (Ajzen, 2005; Herath, 2010) was chosen as one of
the theoretical and conceptual bases for this study because it appeared to be a useful
account of the entire diagnostic cycle, from evidence collection to administration of
treatment, as a human would proceed (but not as software would proceed, because
software does not take therapeutic actions). This model complements the analysis of
distributed cognition explored earlier in the literature review, via an examination of how
diagnostic software adds knowledge on which a doctor-software system can act. In
addition, the three classic components of diagnosis (that is, computing, satisficing, and
intuition) can fit within the Planned Behavior Model. In reference to Table 3, computing
is a source of behavioral beliefs (element 1a of the model); intuition is a source of beliefs
about beliefs (element 1c) and motivation (elements 4a and 4c), as is also the force that
promotes belief in normativity (1b). Finally, computation, satisficing, and intuition work
together to determine doctors’ attitudes, behavioral intentions, and actual behavior.
It is important to note that the relationship between the three classic elements of
diagnosis (computation, satisficing, and intuition) and the Planned Behavior Model is a
conceptual relationship. The relationship between the model and the elements of
diagnosis has not been explored in the literature, and is better thought of as a means of
interweaving behavioral theory with diagnostic science rather than as a precise
description of what takes place during diagnostic decisions.
It is possible to think of the diagnostic process as a search to reduce possibilities
(Sox & Higgins, 1988) in the match between a set of symptoms and diseases that match
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those symptoms. In this process, the role of computation is to eliminate as many
inappropriate or poor matches as possible. The role of satisficing is to treat the possible
disease matches and make empirical observations to test whether the diagnosis is
working. The role of intuition is to bypass both computation and satisficing in those cases
in which the physician makes what is essentially an educated, experience-based
diagnostic guess. Diagnostic software can contribute in each of these domains of
diagnosis.
For example, if fed the input that a patient has elevated alpha fetoprotein,
diagnostic software could either return a single suggestion based on statistical likelihoods
of the fit between symptom and disease—for example, Patient has liver cancer—or else
a list of all of the diseases with which an elevation of alpha fetoprotein is consistent, a list
that can be sorted based on likelihood. The default setting on various medical software
packages, including DiagnosisPro and Connectance, is to return a list of diseases with
which a symptom is consistent, sometimes accompanied by a percentage quantification of
the fit between symptom and disease (e.g., 5% of patients with hemothorax have atypical
mycobacteria). Thus, the current medical software packages can engage in computation,
satisficing, and a form of intuition (Newborn, 2003). Once again, however, it remains to
be discovered in the qualitative portion of this study what doctors think of diagnostic
software’s intuitive or pseudo-intuitive capabilities.
The Role of Software Technology in Diagnoses
Medical technology has existed from the beginning of the practice of medicine,
given what is known about ancient human attempts at surgery (Cockburn, Cockburn, &
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Reyman, 1998). In this study, however, only computer software will be discussed under
the rubric of medical technology. It is appropriate, then, to delimit the discussion to
computer software and to tie its development to medical decision-making. With that
limitation in mind, the remainder of this final section of the literature review will dwell
on recent research on diagnostic software. The purpose of this discussion is to gather as
much knowledge as possible about what scholars think of the characteristics, strength,
and weaknesses of diagnostic medical software. This discussion will be integrated with
the earlier discussions of theory, and of the three frames—computation, satisficing, and
intuition—of diagnostic decision-making.
To begin with, diagnostic medical software can be divided into two broad
categories. One kind of diagnostic software is embedded into diagnostic medical
machines or databases; this kind of software does not make a diagnosis, per se, but rather
provides information that is extremely important for the doctor in making a diagnosis
(Eadie, Taylor, &Gibson, 2012). Another kind of software is specifically designed to be
diagnostic in nature; fed data about a set of symptoms, it returns a diagnosis or list of
diagnoses, accompanied by relevant information (Eadie et al., 2012). Both of these kinds
of software will be discussed in turn.
Many different kinds of diagnostic software accompany many different kinds of
medical devices. One common and instructive example is that of software that
accompanies a computerized tomography (CT) machine (De Palma, 2011). CT machines,
which have a characteristic tube-like shape, are designed to take a three-dimensional
image of human subjects. For example, CT scanning is often performed in order to
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determine whether tumors, calcification, infarction, or other conditions are present in a
patient (DePalma, 2011). A patient who comes to a doctor complaining of an
unaccountable pain in the jaw might turn out to be suffering from a tumor that is pressing
down on a nerve, and that might show up in a CT scan (DePalma, 2011).
On its own, a CT scan conveys purely visual information. This information has to
be interpreted (DePalma, 2011). A great deal of data is interpreted directly in the CT
machine interface by diagnostic software that is part of the CT package (Fujiyoshi,
Kadowaki, Kadowaki, Sekikawa, Ohkubo, & Miura, 2011). For example, the medical
equipment company Siemens (2012) sells a workstation to accompany its CT unit, and
one of the functions of the workstation is to be able to perform calcium analysis. For
example, Siemens’ CT software can calculate what is known as a calcium score for the
patient, on a vessel-by-vessel basis. Typically, if a patient were to have a CT scan for
calcification, it would be the software itself—for example, Siemens’ Crealife CT
Calcium Score Analysis Function—that would make the diagnosis of calcification, as in
the case of hardened arteries (Baumuller, Leschka, Desbiolles, Stolzmann, Scheffel, &
Seifert et al., 2009). Of course, that is not the only case in which calcification of the
arteries could be diagnosed. A doctor could reach the same conclusion by means of a
traditional differential diagnosis. The advantage of the CT software is that it can make a
diagnosis whose accuracy cannot be replicated by a doctor. For example, in order to
determine a calcium score for different blood vessels in a patient’s body, the doctor could
theoretically probe into the vessels with a scalpel, take samples, and make manual
calculations, but such a procedure would be unnecessary, invasive, and dangerous in
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comparison with simply obtaining a calcium score from CT software (Watanabe,
Nakazawa, Higashi, Itoh, & Naito, 2011).
The use of computer-assisted diagnosis for radiology is well supported.
According to Eadie et al., (2012), the significant error rate in radiology is between 220%; in other words, radiologists working without the assistance of any form of
diagnostic software tend to make clinically-significant errors anywhere from 2 to 20% of
the time. Eadie et al.’s meta-review of 147 empirical studies on computer-assisted
diagnosis within the field of radiology revealed that software assistance is associated with
between half and a fourth of the rate of error as compared to unassisted human diagnosis.
As Eadie et al. noted, however, a number of factors make it difficult to quantify the
difference between the accuracy of unassisted human doctors and the accuracy of
computer-assisted doctors; for example, computer-associated diagnostics vary
significantly in purpose, design, and characteristics, so that making precise comparisons
is methodologically difficult. Nonetheless, Eadie et al. suggested that, at worst, computerassisted diagnostic systems could improve a radiologist’s diagnostic accuracy by 25%
and at best by 50%. As a result, computer-assisted diagnosis in the field of radiology has
become nearly ubiquitous in the United States, and is spreading in many other countries
(Eadie et al., 2012).
Researchers in other areas of medicine have replicated results of the kind obtained
in Eadie et al.’s (2012) study. Renz, Bottcher, Diekmann, Poellinger, Maurer, and Pfeil et
al. (2012) discovered that computer-assisted diagnostic software embedded within a
breast magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machine was able to achieve diagnostic
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accuracy of 93.5%, sensitivity of 96.5%, and specificity of 75.5%. The accuracy rate
obtained by computer-assisted diagnosis in this case is between 10-20% greater than
historic accuracy rates achieved without software (Renz et al., 2012).
It is interesting to observe that, in studies in which doctors register their
disapproval of diagnostic software, they fail to take CT and similar software into account.
Doctors utilize diagnostic software on a routine basis because of the superior computing
speed of such software. Indeed, much of the work that is done by this software is now an
indispensable part of medicine; many tasks that doctors once did by hand, involving
mental calculation and manual measurement, now take place in an electronic
environment (Reece, 2009, p. 15).
However, when doctors protest about diagnostic software, they are typically
referring not to the kind of diagnostic software that is embedded in CT machines, but
rather to software, that, fed a particular set of symptoms, returns a diagnosis. Such
software is typically designed to run on a hand-held device that accompanies the doctor,
although it can also run on personal computer workstations or laptops (Randeree, 2007).
Differential diagnosis generation software is, in some ways, an extension of printed
diagnostic manuals, which also serve as a reference guide to physicians trying to make a
diagnosis. One of the differences between diagnostic manuals and diagnostic software is
that doctors control the pace and quality of their interaction with manuals. In other words,
a doctor is the one who makes the decision to consult a manual. On the other hand,
diagnostic software is designed to accompany doctors into consultations with patients,
which some doctors have found to be intrusive (O’Malley, Grossman, Cohen, Kemper, &
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Pham, 2010). One of the classic complaints that doctors have about diagnostic software is
that it represents some kind of curb on their autonomy; thus, it is not necessarily the mere
fact of diagnostic software that some doctors have protested, but rather a pattern of
administrative decisions that is seen as foisting particular tools and practices on doctors
(Queenan, Angst, & Devaraj, 2011).
Bond, Schwartz, Weaver, Levick, Giulianio, and Graber (2011) evaluated
differential diagnosis generators with performance testing. The findings indicated that, in
the field of differential diagnosis in particular, software is of varying strength; it is not yet
the case that, as in the field of radiology, computer-assisted diagnosis has risen to the
level of a must-have tool in differential diagnosis. Bond et al. (2011) discovered that only
two differential diagnosis generators, Isabel ™ and DxPlain ™, performed well in
testing. Ranked on a 5-point scale based on performance in achieving accurate diagnosis
in 20 test cases, both Isabel ™ and DxPlain ™ were able to achieve a mean rating of
3.45. There are thus two major differences between differential diagnosis generators and
computer-assisted diagnosis in the fields of radiology and image analysis in general.
First, differential diagnosis generators are less accurate than computer-assisted diagnosis
in image analysis (Bond et al., 2011). Second, there is a wide variance in the performance
level of commercially available differential diagnosis generators (Bond et al., 2011),
which can be interpreted in a number of ways. First, it could be the case that image
analysis is innately simpler than solving primary medicine cases. Second, image analysis
is more advanced than differential diagnosis software. Since there do not appear to be
empirical studies that compare the sophistication of differential diagnosis software with
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computer-assisted diagnosis in image analysis, these questions have not been resolved;
nonetheless, they ought to be kept in mind by future researchers interested in obtaining a
more detailed understanding of the differences between the two major kinds of diagnostic
software in the medical marketplace.
There is clearly empirical support for the proposition that both differential
diagnosis software and computer-assisted diagnostic software for image analysis work,
although at differing levels of accuracy. There is also support (bolstered by Eadie et al.’s,
2012 meta-review of 147 studies of computer-assisted image analysis in radiology) that
radiologists and other doctors who analyze images work extensively with computerassisted diagnostic systems, especially in the United States. The main open question in
the literature, and the one that is most germane to this study, is the question of how
doctors engage with differential diagnostic software in real-world settings.
Some empirical studies have added important insights to what is known about this
topic. For example, Ramnarayan, Winrow, Coren, Nanduri, Buchdahl, and Jacobs et al.
(2006) conducted a study of how pediatricians used differential diagnosis generators
while on the job. Ramnarayan et al. (2006) discovered that, when given freedom of
choice in resorting to the use of differential diagnosis generators in a pediatric hospital,
physicians chose to access the system only 8.6% of the time, and to examine actual
diagnostic advice only 2, 55% of the time. The mean usage time of the diagnostic system
was only 1 minute, 38 seconds. Ramnarayan et al. reported that the main obstacle to
diagnostic software use cited by the physicians in the study was technical; many
physicians reported difficulty using the interface of the system, and some physicians
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noted that they were working from locations in which access to the differential diagnosis
system was difficult to obtain.
Ramnarayan et al.’s (2006) study has a number of important implications for the
topic of physician use of diagnostic software. To begin with, the study raises the
possibility that, when use of differential diagnosis generators is not mandated, numerous
physicians might simply be refusing diagnostic software because of issues of accessibility
or perceived difficulty. The study provides support for the point made by Umscheid and
Hanson (2011) and Bond et al. (2011) in different contexts, which is that differential
diagnostic generation software has some quality gaps. Umscheid and Hanson
summarized a number of non-technical and non-access-related reasons that physicians
have historically given in order to justify the avoidance of diagnostic software. One such
reason is that, in many medical contexts, the presenting cases are of what Umscheid and
Hanson (2011) described as a “bread and butter” (p. 6) character. Another reason is that
many doctors practice surgery and other practices that Umscheid and Hanson
distinguished from so-called cognitive medicine. A third reason is that, when a presenting
case is complex and a physician has a lack of knowledge, a more likely outcome than
consulting a differential diagnosis generator is to consult a senior colleague or a
colleague with more experience in treating the presenting set of symptoms. Based on
these reasons, Umscheid and Hanson concluded that differential diagnosis software is
useful in a number of contexts that might seldom manifest themselves in a doctor’s
career. However, Umscheid and Hanson reached this conclusion based on a meta-review
of only a few empirical studies, and other views about the nature of the relationship
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between physicians and differential diagnosis generation software should be sought out
and analyzed.
While Umscheid and Hanson (2011) argued that differential diagnosis generators
were not, overall, superior in accuracy or specificity to unaided physician diagnosis
except in limited circumstances, a pseudo-experiment conducted by David, Chira, Eells,
Ladrigan, Papier, and Miller et al. (2011) reached markedly different conclusions. David
et al. (2011) worked with a sample of patients whose cellulitis had been misdiagnosed by
the admitting team. Interestingly, David et al. found that, in 64% of the cases, a
differential diagnostic software package known as Visual Dx had included the correct
diagnosis, which had been ignored or overridden by the physicians in the admitting team.
David et al. discovered that unassisted physicians were only 14% accurate in diagnosing
stasis dermatitis that presented with some of the characteristics of cellulitis. Thus, at least
in their limited field of misdiagnosed cellulitis and based on what was after all a small
sub-sample (N=28) of misdiagnosed patients, the differential diagnostic system studied
by David et al. appeared to be 50% more accurate than an unassisted admitting team.
Results of this kind indicate that differential diagnostic software might have its own
pockets of excellence, especially in contrast to human diagnosticians; one strength of
VisualDX, for example, was its integration with visual data (David et al., 2011). This
result implies that differential diagnostic generators that are able to benefit from the more
advanced forms of image analysis outshine generic differential diagnostic systems that
rely on text and mote limited kinds of input. This implication is supported by the
empirical literature, since there are many studies in which the accuracy and specificity of
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differential diagnostic software embedded in image databases appears to be high (see for
example the meta-review of studies in David et al., 2011’s literature review). There are
fewer studies on the utility of differential diagnosis generators that are disconnected from
visual data.
Another empirical study confirming the superiority of visually based computerassisted diagnosis software over unassisted physicians was that of Puech, Betrouni,
Makni, Dewalle, Villers, and Lemaitre (2009). Puech et al. (2009) discovered that a
computer-assisted diagnostic tool was able to successfully diagnose 77% of instances of
prostate cancer appearing in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) files, whereas expert
radiologists examining the same MRI data only achieved a 70% rate of success. The
findings of this sort indicate why, in radiology, diagnostic software is not an afterthought,
but rather directly integrated into the ordinary diagnostic processes of radiologists.
Of course, many physicians have also indicated their satisfaction with nonvisually-based diagnostic software, explaining that such software narrows down potential
diagnoses, saves time by taking the place of a medical manual, and also serves as a
convenient resource for patients, since diagnoses can be printed or emailed to patients
from within the software interface (Chowdhury, Roy, & Saha, 2011, p. 221). Thus, the
reaction to diagnostic software—at least in the United States—can best be described as
mixed. Many doctors admire the computational robustness and convenience of diagnostic
software, but resent such software’s potential to cut into the autonomy of their practices
(Menachemi, Matthews, Ford, Hikmet, & Brooks, 2009). In terms of the Planned
Behavior Model (Herath, 2010), doctors’ beliefs about their own decisions is thus a
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determinant of how they feel about diagnostic software. Doctors who prize the autonomy
of individual and independent beliefs and attitudes as a part of the diagnostic process
might wish to distance themselves from software (Seeley, 2009). Older doctors might
have a resistance to learning and re-learning new technology (Seeley, 2009). Other
doctors take a different approach, seeing diagnostic software not as a form of competition
but rather as an extension of the existing infrastructure of medical informatics (Shield,
Goldman, Anthony, Wang, Doyle, & Borkan, 2010). Doctors who dislike learning new
technology, who have physical difficulties with reading digital data, or who dislike
having to install new software might also be at odds with using more software in their
practices (Seeley, 2009).
It should be emphasized that the purpose of diagnostic software is not, and has
seldom been described as, an attempt to replace the doctor. The role of diagnostic
software can be better understood through the concept of distributed cognition.
According to Hazlehurst, Gorman, and McMullen (2008), distributed cognition is the act
of cognition diffused across a system that is larger than the individual doctor is. For
example, a doctor sitting and thinking about a diagnosis would be engaging in pure
cognition, but a doctor consulting a reference manual or interacting with software would
become part of what Hazlehurst et al. called a model of distributed cognition. The act of
cognition cannot be said to reside in any one component of the system, but is distributed
across it. In contemporary times, the spread of computer technology has brought
distributed cognition to many fields; yet, as Hazlehurst et al. pointed out, distributed
cognition has been around at least as long as humans have created machines and tools
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(from the abacus to the personal computer) that can assist them in cognition. According
to Hazlehurst et al. (2008), the goal of studying the diagnostic process as it manifests
itself in software versus the doctor is not to argue on behalf of one or the other
component of the system. Doctors and software will continue to work together as part of
a system of distributed cognition that is deeply embedded in medicine. While accepting
the reality of distributed cognition, however, it is still necessary to be able to better
understand the division of labor between humans and software tools. Hsiung (2012) has
pointed out that the pace of software adoption in American hospitals has been far slower
than the adoption of other forms of medical technology. As Hsiung has stated, many
doctors have been perfectly willing to take advantage of tools to assist them in arriving at
their diagnostic decisions, but have resented the incursion of software that can take the
input of a set of symptoms and return a diagnosis as an output. Whether this attitude is
rational or not, it has been observed in many different medical contexts, leading to the
conclusion that doctors take special pride in diagnosis and are wary of relinquishing their
role to software. Thus, all of the forms of computational utility enabled by diagnostic
software are best thought of parts of a distributed cognition system in which the key
diagnostic role is still played by the doctor.
The key problem acknowledged in the literature, especially literature pertaining to
the American healthcare system, is the rate of misdiagnosis. Umscheid and Hanson
(2011) pointed out that deaths from misdiagnosis in the United States have remained
study somewhere between 40,000 and 80,000 a year, depending on the methodology by
which such deaths are ascribed to misdiagnosis. There is no simple way in which to
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illuminate the possible relationship between the unchanged rates of misdiagnosis in the
United States and the use or non-use of diagnostic software. However, given that
software of this kind has been available for over 30 years and was specifically designed
in order to lower the rates of misdiagnosis, it is worth continuing to gather and analyze
data on physicians’ usage of diagnostic software, and to understand what usage patterns
might have to do with accurate diagnosis, misdiagnosis, and other medical outcomes.
The empirical literature offers some insights into the relationship between
diagnostic software and diagnostic outcomes. First, there is strong evidence that
computer-assisted diagnostic systems that are tied into visual databases are both highly
accurate and highly specific in their diagnoses. Eadie et al.’s (2012) meta-review of 147
studies in the field of radiology found that such diagnostic software was nearly
ubiquitous in the United States, and routinely achieved diagnostic accuracy rates over
90%. Second, there is some research suggesting that physician adoption of differential
diagnostic generation software—as opposed to diagnostic software embedded in
machines or associated with image databases, as in radiology—is low, whether because
of technical problems and perceived inconvenience (Ramnarayan et al., 2006) or whether
because physicians seldom encounter a genuine need to use such software (Umscheid &
Hanson, 2011). Nonetheless, there is other research (David et al., 2011) suggesting that
differential diagnostic software can perform better than unassisted physicians in some
fields, such as dermatology can.
In general, the sheer number of symptom permutations, types of medicine, and
differences between diagnostic software packages makes it difficult to reach conclusions
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about the relationship between such software and diagnostic success. Nonetheless, there
is compelling evidence that diagnostic software is, at best, superior to human diagnostic
procedures and, at worst, able to function as a helpful adjunct to human diagnostic
processes.
Summary and Conclusion
In general, the literature is in agreement (Ahlers et al., 2010; Bath-Hextall et al.,
2011; Carpenito-Moyet, 2008; First & Tasman, 2011; Gifford, 2011) that diagnosis is a
process characterized by the following steps: (a) Gathering of evidence, including
physical evidence and verbal evidence (gathered from speaking to the patient) pertaining
to a patient’s symptoms; (b) fitting knowledge about the symptoms to a specific disease,
whether known or postulated; (c) determining the most appropriate treatment for the
disease; and (d) fine-tuning the treatment based on ongoing observations of the
interaction between the patient and the proposed treatment. However, there is some
debate on the question of how culture- and value-laden the process of diagnosis is; with
certain scholars (Byrne, 2012; Fadiman, 1988), having argued that diagnosis is heavily
influenced by culture. On balance, however, there is stronger support in the literature for
the idea that diagnosis is a repeatable, rigorous scientific process with the discrete steps
enumerated above.
Diagnosis was shown to have three components: Computation, satisficing, and
intuition. The main computing concepts (Lefrancois, 2011; Nielsen, 2011) that apply in
medicine are those of (a) engineering computing, in which the input and output can
interact several times over the course of diagnosis; (b) the decision tree, in which the
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utility of each possibility is calculated independently; and (c) confidence levels, in which
relative rather than absolute recommendations are made based on statistical likelihoods
that an observed symptom or set of symptoms corresponds with a disease. Computation
can prevent certain cognitive fallacies, such as the representativeness heuristic, from
manifesting themselves during the diagnostic process (Schwab, 2009) and serve as the
basis for a self-correcting form of satisficing. Satisficing can be a comparison of several
alternative solutions followed by a choice of the solution that seems more likely to
succeed, or else an experimental means of working through possibilities (for example, six
diagnoses of six different diseases that are all equally likely matches of an observed
symptom set) in which the uniquely human characteristic of on-the-fly learning is
important (Garnham & Oakhill, 1994). Finally, doctors often use intuition to shorten the
decision process, make difficult diagnostic decisions, or raise the chances that patients
will comply with a treatment implied by a specific diagnosis (Kattan & Cowen, 2009).
Overall, the utility of software seems to be limited to computation; however, the literature
review did not contain any studies that tried to quantify human advantages in satisficing
and intuition versus the software advantage in computation.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction to Research Method
The purpose of this quantitative study was to draw upon physician-provided data
to determine why, at least in physicians’ opinions, the prevalence of misdiagnosis has
remained high despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software. Knowledge that is
more definitive is needed about why misdiagnosis has persisted well into the age of
diagnostic software. The research method described and defended in this chapter was
intended to generate such knowledge.
In addressing the question of why the widespread adoption of diagnostic software
has not coincided with a decrease in the prevalence of misdiagnosis, a quantitative
approach was necessary to determine which of some of the possible answers to this
question—diagnostic software insufficiency, insufficient/improper use by physicians, or
liability—is more popular with physicians and to determine whether answers to this
question vary significantly depending on the demographic and professional
characteristics of physicians, which also served as control variables in the study design in
a manner described later in the chapter.
Restatement of Research Questions and Hypotheses
The research questions associated with the study were as follows:
Research Question 1: Does use of diagnostic software decrease misdiagnosis in
healthcare versus unassisted human diagnostic methods?
H01: Diagnostic software use has more misdiagnoses in healthcare than
unassisted human diagnostic methods.
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HA1: Diagnostic software use has less misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted
human diagnostic methods.
Research Question 2: Do physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?
H02: Physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnosis in healthcare.
HA2: Physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnosis in healthcare.
Research Question 3: Is physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software extensive
enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?
H03: Physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.
HA3: Physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is extensive enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.
Research Question 4: Do liability concerns prevent physicians from using
diagnostic software?
H04: Liability concerns do not prevent physicians from using diagnostic software.
HA4: Liability concerns prevent physicians from using diagnostic software.
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Research Design and Approach
According to Windelband (1913), nomothesis—the hallmark of quantitative
research—is the search for laws and generalizations; nomothetic methods try to examine
a research phenomena in the most general way possible. On the other hand, idiography is
the study of unique phenomena. In Windelband’s example, an idiographic researcher
might spend time and effort on trying to understand a single painting, whereas a
nomothetic researcher might look for general differences between two classes of
paintings.
Diagnostic practices can, and indeed should, be studied from both nomothetic and
idiographic perspectives because these two perspectives complement and enrich each
other. In most qualitative methodologies, idiography requires rich narrative data (Lapan,
Quartaroli, & Riemer, 2011) whereas nomothesis can be carried out with basic survey or
numeric data (Mehl, Conner, & Csikzentmihalyi, 2011). In this study, nomothetic data
were gathered using an original survey designed to answer the four research questions of
the study.
There are numerous quantitative designs available. Experimental, preexperimental, and quasi-experimental designs are all reliant on the experimenter’s control
or partial control of variables (Creswell, 2009). In this study, I could not control or
manipulate factors related to the use of diagnostic software, so these three approaches
were not appropriate. A cross-sectional design is based on collecting data from
participants at a single point at time; such designs can be used either to measure change
in response to some manipulation of variables or else the prevalence of some attitude or
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behavior in a test population (Creswell, 2009). A cross-sectional design was, therefore, an
appropriate design for the study, given the focus on measuring physicians’ adoption of
and attitudes to diagnostic software at a single point in time.
Setting and Sample
Conceptually—not physically, because the study was not reliant on direct
observation or on-site analysis—the setting for this study was the world of medical
diagnostics. According to Shealy (2011), diagnostic skill is taught and is required to be
learned in all medical schools that offer an accredited degree in biomedicine; thus, it was
assumed that all doctors in the sample were, in their own ways, experts in the process of
diagnosis. The study qualification criteria for doctors were, simply, (a) being currently
qualified and practicing as a doctor in the United States, (b) using English comfortably
enough to participate in the survey, (c) having access to diagnostic software, and (d)
giving consent. Given that the study is in English, it made the most sense to sample
doctors from English-speaking countries. As the United States has by far the largest
population of native English speakers in the world (Yoshihara, Sylva, & Eberstadt, 2011),
and is home to most of the major diagnostic software providers currently in operation
(Kramme, Hoffmanm, & Pozos, 2011), sampling from the United States was logical.
In the United States, the AMA offers a master list of every U.S.-licensed
physician; according to the AMA (2012), there were over 814,000 licensed physicians in
the United States. I sent recruitment emails to 3,100 AMA-accredited physicians through
their professional database licensees’ distribution list with the use of Survey Monkey
platform that yielded a sample of 99 physicians for the study. According to Kennett and
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Salini (2011), the average response rate for a marketing campaign in which the target
message recipient has some innate interest is between 2 and 3%. Assuming that this result
is achieved, reaching out to 3,100 doctors (by a combination of e-mail, where available,
and mass mailing) yielded a likelihood of 62 doctor respondents.
A sample size over 60 is in line with the sample sizes reported by some previous
scholars working with medical populations (Keeney et al., 2011) and should therefore be
considered acceptable, even though it was not anticipated whether this sample size was
sufficiently large or qualified enough to yield rich data for the study, or whether a sample
over 60 was sufficient for all statistical procedures. The power analysis in Figure 1
revealed that, with an effect size of 0.5 and an  of .05, a sample size over 45 is sufficient
for a one sample t test (that is, a t test comparing a group mean versus a hypothesized
value) at a power of 0.95.
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Figure 1. Power analysis.
Data Collection and Analysis
The first question asked was What kind of diagnostic software do you use? While
none of the research questions pertained to what kind of diagnostic software did
physicians use, it was still important to gather information on this point for descriptive
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purposes. A brief definition and some examples of diagnostic software were provided as
part of the survey.
The first research question that guided the study were as follows: Does use of
diagnostic software decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare versus unassisted human
diagnostic methods?
H01: Diagnostic software use has more misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted
human diagnostic methods. Data for this question were collected by presenting the
following two survey prompts:
1. My use of diagnostic software is likely to result in more misdiagnoses in
healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods.
2. In general, physicians’ use of diagnostic software is likely to result in
more misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic
methods.
All of the survey questions differentiate between doctors’ own use of diagnostic software
and their general perceptions about diagnostic software. Responses for all of the survey
questions were conducted on a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 = completely disagree, 2 =
disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 5 = somewhat agree, 6
= agree, and 7 = completely agree.
The operationalization of the null hypothesis was Ho: The value of the mean
survey response was greater than or equal to 4. I would have rejected the null hypothesis
if the observed mean response to the survey question were sufficiently small so that the p
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value was less than the alpha of 0.05. Two one-tailed one-sample t tests were done, one
for each survey prompt.
The second research question that guided the study were as follows: Do
physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in
healthcare?
H02: Physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnosis in healthcare. Data for this question were collected by presenting the
sample the following two surveys prompts:
1. I do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis
in healthcare,
2. In general, physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.
The operationalization of the null hypothesis was Ho: The value of the mean survey
response was greater than or equal to 4. I would have rejected the null hypothesis if the
observed mean response to the survey question were sufficiently small so that the p-value
was less than the alpha of 0.05. Two one-tailed one-sample t tests were done, one for
each survey prompt.
The third research question that guided the study were as follows: Is physicians’
knowledge of diagnostic software extensive enough to decrease misdiagnosis in
healthcare?
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H03: Physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. Data for this question were collected by presenting
the following two survey prompts:
1. My knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to decrease
misdiagnosis in healthcare.
2. In general, physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive
enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.
The operationalization of the null hypothesis was Ho: The value of the mean survey
response was greater than or equal to 4. I would have rejected the null hypothesis if the
observed mean response to the survey question were sufficiently small so that the p-value
was less than the alpha of 0.05. Two one-tailed one-sample t tests were done, one for
each survey prompt.
The fourth research question that guided the study were as follows: Do liability
concerns prevent physicians from using diagnostic software?
H04: Liability concerns do not prevent physicians from using diagnostic software.
Data for this question were collected by presenting the following two questions:
1. Liability concerns do not prevent me from using diagnostic software.
2. In general, liability concerns do not prevent physicians from using diagnostic
software.
The operationalization of the null hypothesis was Ho: The value of the mean survey
response was greater than or equal to 4. I would have rejected the null hypothesis if the
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observed mean response to the survey question were sufficiently small so that the p-value
was less than the alpha of 0.05.
Hypothesis testing for the research questions were carried out with the assistance
of standard statistical software (i.e., SPSS™). According to Dewberry (2004), Likert
scales are continuous: “a common way of obtaining continuous data in organizational
research is with a Likert scale” (p. 9). A t test was, therefore, appropriate to use with a
Likert scale.
No instruments other than the Likert-type scales discussed above were used in the
study. Not using an instrument allowed doctors to define the concepts of expertise,
frequency of use, liability, and the capability of diagnostic software in their own personal
and professional contexts instead of requiring them to align their responses with others’
operationalizations of these concepts. Additionally, since physicians are among the
busiest of all professionals, it was unlikely that they would submit to the administration
of several scales; it was therefore a research advantage to design an instrument that could
be answered in only a few minutes.
Instrumentation and Materials
The instrument for data collection was an online survey, hosted on the Survey
Monkey™ platform that presented the following prompts, in addition to demographic
questions about the doctor’s age, practice area, and gender:
1. What kind of diagnostic software do you use?
2. My use of diagnostic software is likely to result in more misdiagnoses in
healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods.
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3. In general, physicians’ use of diagnostic software is likely to result in more
misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods.
4.

I do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in
healthcare.

5. In general, physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.
6. My knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to decrease
misdiagnosis in healthcare.
7. In general, physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough
to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.
8.

Liability concerns do not prevent me from using diagnostic software.

9. In general, liability concerns do not prevent physicians from using diagnostic
software.
Because this was a new questionnaire, a reliability analysis was conducted on the
first 15 to 20 responses. Cronbach’s alpha was used to determine whether the survey
instrument had sufficient reliability. Changes were made to the survey items based upon
the results of this analysis. The proposed sampling strategy to select 3,100 doctors
randomly from the master list of American Medical Association yielded a likelihood of
62 doctor respondents. This was theoretical and increased validity. Physicians who
completed the survey may have different characteristics such as, different areas of
practice and specializations. It is likely, therefore, that the results were not highly
generalizable to the entire population of American doctors.
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Protection of Human Participants
The four commonly-accepted (Creswell, 2009) categories of ethical assurances in
research are offering protection from harm, using informed consent, defending the
privacy of study subjects, and being honest with professional colleagues and study
subjects. This study posed no innate harms to subjects and will use best practices
(Creswell, 2009) for informed consent. IRB approval (# 07-16-13-0036160) was obtained
prior to the collection of any data. Respondent privacy was defended in the following
ways: First, the surveys did not collect respondents’ names or other data that could be
used by outside parties to identify respondents; second, all electronic forms were
encrypted; third, all electronic forms received by the researcher from Survey Monkey™
were placed on a password-protected laptop to which only the researcher had access, and
were furthermore backed up by online storage at Box.com ™ in case of laptop theft or
loss; finally, all data will be destroyed no earlier than seven years after the study has been
accepted by the researcher’s institution. Honesty with professional colleagues and study
subjects were ensured by means of following the ethical precepts of research, and by
means of publishing the raw data of the study for open scrutiny at the end of the study.
Conclusion
The quantitative approach described and defended in this chapter was designed to
address the question of why the widespread adoption of diagnostic software has not
coincided with a decrease in the prevalence of misdiagnosis. The quantitative approach
determined which of the possible answers to this question—diagnostic software
insufficiency, insufficient / improper use by physicians, or liability—was more plausible
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to physicians, in a manner that casted more light on why the problem of misdiagnosis has
persisted despite the proliferation of technology.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction to Results
The purpose of this study is to draw upon physician-provided data to determine
why, at least in physicians’ opinions, the prevalence of misdiagnosis has remained high
despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software. This chapter contains three
sections for reporting and interpreting the results of the study. The first section is an
overview of descriptive statistics. The second section consists of the inferential statistics
associated with the research hypotheses. The third section consists of findings that are not
related to the research questions but that still cast light on the question of physicians’
relationships with diagnostic software.
The research questions of the study were as follows:
Research Question 1: Does use of diagnostic software use decrease misdiagnosis
in healthcare versus unassisted human diagnostic methods?
Research Question 2: Do physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?
Research Question 3: Is physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software extensive
enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?
Research Question 4: Do liability concerns prevent physicians from using
diagnostic software?
I collected data from July 8, 2013 to October 16, 2013. There were 99 surveys
distributed, of which 97 were completed, indicating a completion rate of roughly 98%.
One of the 97 respondents did not answer the questions pertaining to Hypotheses 5 to 8.
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Recruitment emails were sent to 3,100 physicians; the response rate was roughly 3%,
close to the rate anticipated in Chapter 3. There was a deviation from the data collection
plan presented in Chapter 3. The sample of 99 was likely to be representative of the
physician population of 814,000, given that the a priori sample size analysis in Figure 1
suggested a sample of 45 in order to achieve a confidence interval of 95% in the context
of the chosen statistical procedure and effect size. The Cronbach’s Alpha of the survey
was .761, indicating a high level of internal consistency.
Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Variables
The specialty areas of physician’s bar chart in Figure 2 indicated that there were 97
respondents in the sample from a wide variety of specialization areas of medicine.

Figure 2. Specialty areas of physicians in sample.
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According to data collected on specialty areas of physicians in the sample
presented in Figure 2, the most well-represented categories of medicine in the survey
were family medicine (22 out of 97 respondents), internal medicine (17 out of 97
respondents), and OB/GYN (14 out of 97 respondents).
Further analysis of descriptive statistics revealed that the majority of the sample
(59.8%) had practiced medicine between 0 and 10 years (Table 4), that the sample was
geographically well-distributed (Table 5), the sample tended to be fairly young (Table 6),
and that men and women were equal in number (Table 7).
Table 4
Experience of Physicians in Sample

Less than 5 years
5-10 years
11-20 years
21-30 years
More than 30
years
Total

Frequency
36
22
18
11

Percent
37.1
22.7
18.6
11.3

9

9.3

96
99.0
Missing
1
1.0
______________________ _________ ________
Total
97
100.0
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Table 5
Geographic Location of Physicians in Sample
Frequency Percent
New England
17
17.5
Mid-Atlantic
16
16.5
South Atlantic
18
18.6
South
11
11.3
Midwest
9
9.3
Mountain
9
9.3
Pacific
16
16.5
Total
96
99.0
Missing System
1
1.0
______ ___________________ _________ ________
Total
97
100.0
Table 6
Age of Physicians in Sample
Frequency
Less than 30 years
old
30-40 years old
41-50 years old
51-60 years old
61-65 years old
More than 65 years _

23

Percent
23.7

26
26.8
20
20.6
16
16.5
7
7.2
________5 _____5.2

Total
Table 7
Gender of Physicians in Sample
Frequency Percent
Male
51
52.6
Female 46
47.4
Total
97
100.0

97

100.0
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Descriptive statistics pertaining to participants’ usage of diagnostic software were
also collected and are shown in Tables 8 to 14. I presented the results of the data
collected on use and non use of different diagnostic software packages among the
sampled physicians in Tables 8 to 14.
Table 8
Access to Various Diagnostic
Medical Packages
None
Isabel
DXplain
Your rapid diagnosis
Diagnosis pro
Connectance
Search engines
Use more than 1
software___
Total

Frequency Percent
42
17
7
8
6
9
1

43.3
17.5
7.2
8.2
6.2
9.3
1.0

________7 _____7.2
97

100.0

Frequency

Percent

Table 9
Diagnostic Medical Packages
Used
None
Isabel
DXplain
Your rapid diagnosis
Diagnosis pro
Connectance
Search engines
Use more than 1
software___
Total

42
17
7
8
6
9
1

43.3
17.5
7.2
8.2
6.2
9.3
1.0

_________7 ______7.2
97

100.0
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Table 10
Length of Access to
Frequency Percent
Diagnostic Software
Not applicable
42
43.3
Less than 6 months
8
8.2
6 months to 1 year
10
10.3
1-3 years
14
14.4
3-5 years
17
17.5
Use more than 5
_________6 ______6.2
years_
Total
97
100.0
Table 11
Length of Using
Frequency Percent
Diagnostic Software
Not applicable
42
43.3
Less than 6 months
8
8.2
6 months to 1 year
12
12.4
1-3 years
12
12.4
3-5 years
17
17.5
Use more than 5
________6 _____6.2
years_
Total
97
100.0
Table 12
Access to Types of Diagnostic
Software
None
Isabel
DXplain
Your rapid diagnosis
Diagnosis pro
Connectance
Search engines
EasyDiagnosis
NxOpinion
Use more than 1
software__
Total

Frequency Percent
42
11
8
6
5
8
5
2
1

43.3
11.3
8.2
6.2
5.2
8.2
5.2
2.1
1.0

________9 _____9.3
97

100.0
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Table 13
Diagnostic Software Currently Used

None
Isabel
DXplain
Your rapid diagnosis
Diagnosis pro
Connectance
Search engines
EasyDiagnosis
NxOpinion
Use more than 1
software___
Total

Frequency Percent
42
43.3
11
11.3
8
8.2
6
6.2
5
5.2
8
8.2
5
5.2
2
2.1
1
1.0
________9 _____9.3
97

100.0

Table 14
Length of Time Using Current Software

Frequency Percent
Not applicable
47
48.5
Less than 6 months
7
7.2
6 months to 1 year
14
14.4
1-3 years
9
9.3
3-5 years
14
14.4
Use more than 5
________6 _____6.2
years_
Total
97
100.0
One of the important insights that emerged from Tables 8 to 14 was that slightly
over 43% of the sample reported not using, and not having ever used, diagnostic
software. In the Other Findings section of this chapter, some of the differences between
diagnostic software adopters and non adopters were explored in greater depth. In the next
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section of the chapter, inferential statistics were calculated in order to perform the
hypothesis tests to provide information for answering the research questions of the study.
Inferential Statistics
Responses for all of the survey questions followed a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 =
completely disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = somewhat agree, 6 = agree, and 7 = completely agree.
The research questions and hypotheses of the study were as follows:
Research Question 1: Does use of diagnostic software decrease misdiagnosis in
healthcare versus unassisted human diagnostic methods?
H01: Diagnostic software use has more misdiagnoses in healthcare than
unassisted human diagnostic methods.
HA1: Diagnostic software use has less misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted
human diagnostic methods.
Research Question 2: Do physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?
H02: Physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnosis in healthcare.
HA2: Physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnosis in healthcare.
Research Question 3: Is physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software extensive
enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?
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H03: Physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.
HA3: Physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is extensive enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.
Research Question 4: Do liability concerns prevent physicians from using
diagnostic software?
H04: Liability concerns do not prevent physicians from using diagnostic software.
HA4: Liability concerns prevent physicians from using diagnostic software.
One-sample t tests were carried out on each of the null hypotheses. Before the t
tests, descriptive statistics were collected for each of the survey questions. These
descriptive statistics included four measurements: (a) N (the number of respondents who
answered the prompt), (b) mean (the mean response score, on a Likert scale of 1-7), (c)
standard deviation, and (d) standard error of the mean. These descriptive statistics, as
well as the inferential statistic of the 95% confidence interval, are presented in Table 15
and Table 16. Note that one of the 97 respondents did not respond to any of the Table 16
questions, and that another respondent did not respond to the question for H7.
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Table 15
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample (Personal Use)
H

Survey Questions

N

Mean

SD

SE
Mean

95% Confidence
Interval of the Mean
Lower
Upper

H1

My use of diagnostic software is
likely to result in more
misdiagnoses in healthcare than
unassisted human diagnostic
methods.

55

2.47

2.01

0.27

1.92

3.01

I do not use diagnostic software
frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnoses in healthcare.

55

3.24

1.93

0.26

2.71

3.75

55

3.60

2.06

0.28

3.04

4.15

55

5.31

1.99

0.27

4.77

5.84

H2

H3

H4

My knowledge of diagnostic
software is not extensive enough
to result in a decrease in
misdiagnoses.
Liability concerns do not prevent
me from using diagnostic
software.
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Table 16
Descriptive Statistics of the collected Sample (Physicians in General)
H

Survey Questions

N

Mean

SD

SE
Mean

95% Confidence
Interval of the Mean
Lower
Upper

H5

In general, physicians’ use of
diagnostic software is likely to
result in more misdiagnoses in
healthcare than unassisted human
diagnostic methods.

96

3.89

2.09

0.21

3.46

4.30

96

3.74

1.90

0.19

3.35

4.13

95

3.99

1.92

0.20

3.60

4.38

96

5.22

1.64

0.17

4.88

5.55

H6

H7

H8

In general, physicians do not use
diagnostic software frequently
enough to decrease misdiagnoses
in healthcare.
In general, physicians’ knowledge
of diagnostic software is not
extensive enough to result in a
decrease in misdiagnoses.
In general, liability concerns do
not prevent physicians from using
diagnostic software.

After the descriptive statistics were collected, an attempt was made to measure
whether there was a significant difference between the mean of the response and the
value of 4; 4 was chosen as the cutoff value because it was the mean value between 1 and
7 on the Likert scale. The p values are presented in Table 17.

Table 17
One-Sample T Test Results
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Survey question

t

p (twotailed)

p (onetailed)

Effect
Size

H1

My use of diagnostic software is
likely to result in more misdiagnoses
in healthcare than unassisted human
diagnostic methods.

-5.641

<.001

<.001

.76

H2

I do not use diagnostic software
frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnoses in healthcare.

-2.929

.005

.0025

.40

H3

My knowledge of diagnostic
Software is not extensive enough
to result in a decrease in
misdiagnoses.

-1.440

.156

.078

.29

H4

Liability concerns do not prevent me
from using diagnostic software.

4.880

<.001

>.999

.66

H5

In general, physicians’ use of
diagnostic software is likely to result
in more misdiagnoses in healthcare
than unassisted human diagnostic
methods.

-.514

.183

.0915

.05

H6

In general, physicians do not use
diagnostic software frequently
enough to decrease misdiagnoses in
healthcare.

-1.340

.593

.2965

.13

H7

In general, physicians’ knowledge of
diagnostic software is not extensive
enough to result in a decrease in
misdiagnoses.

-.053

.958

.479

.005

H8

In general, liability concerns do not
prevent physicians from using
diagnostic software.

7.297

<.001

>.999

.74
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Since a one-tailed approach was used, the directionality of the one-sample t-tests
was ≥ 4 for each of the hypotheses. With this point in mind, the results of the one-sample
t-tests were as follows.
A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H1, whether doctors’ personal use
of diagnostic software was likely to result in more misdiagnoses in healthcare than
unassisted human diagnostic methods. The null hypothesis was that personal diagnostic
software use resulted in more misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human
diagnostic methods. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this
prompt (M = 2.47, SD = 2.008) was significantly lower than 4, t(96) = -5.641, p < .001,
so the null hypothesis was rejected. Some support was therefore found for the alternative
hypothesis, which was the claim that personal diagnostic software use resulted in fewer
misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods. Table 18 and
Table 19 contain the test results for each of the eight survey prompts:
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Table 18
Hypothesis Testing Results (Personal Use)
Null hypothesis

p(one
tailed)

Result

H1

My use of diagnostic software
diagnostic software is likely to result
in more misdiagnoses in healthcare
than unassisted human diagnostic
methods.

<.001

Rejected

H2

I do not use diagnostic software
frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnoses in healthcare.

.0025

Rejected

H3

My knowledge of diagnostic software
is not extensive enough to result in a
decrease in misdiagnoses.

.078

Retained

H4

Liability concerns do not
prevent physicians from using
diagnostic software.

>.999

Retained
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Table 19
Hypothesis Testing Results (Physicians in General Use)
Null hypothesis

p(one
tailed)

Result

H5

In general, physicians’ use of
diagnostic software is likely to result
in more misdiagnoses in healthcare
than unassisted human diagnostic
methods.

.0915

Retained

H6

In general, physicians do not use
diagnostic software frequently
enough to decrease misdiagnoses in
healthcare.

.2965

Retained

H7

In general, physicians’ knowledge of
diagnostic software is not extensive
enough to result in a decrease in
misdiagnoses.

.479

Retained

H8

In general, liability concerns do not
prevent physicians from using
diagnostic software.

>.999

Retained

A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H2, whether doctors thought that
they used diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnoses in healthcare.
The null hypothesis was that physicians thought they did not use diagnostic software
frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. The results indicated that
doctors’ mean level of agreement with this prompt (M = 3.24, SD = 1.934) was
significantly lower than 4, t(96) = -2.929, p = .0025, so the null hypothesis was rejected.
Some support was therefore found for the alternative hypothesis, which was that
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physicians thought they used diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnosis in healthcare.
A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H3, whether doctors thought that
their knowledge of diagnosis software was extensive enough to result in a decrease in
misdiagnoses. The null hypothesis was that doctors would agree with this prompt. The
results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this prompt (M = 3.60, SD =
2.060) was not significantly lower than 4, t(96) = -1.440, p = .078, I have not found
evidence to reject this statement, so the null hypothesis was retained.
A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H4, whether doctors thought that
liability concerns did not prevent them from using diagnostic software. The null
hypothesis was that liability concerns did not prevent physicians from using diagnostic
software. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this prompt (M
= 5.31, SD = 1.990) was significantly higher than 4, t(96) = 4.880, p = 1.000, I have not
found evidence to reject this statement, so the null hypothesis was retained.
A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H5, whether doctors thought that,
in general, physician use of diagnostic software was likely to result in more misdiagnoses
in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods. The null hypothesis was that, in
general, diagnostic software use resulted in more misdiagnoses in healthcare than
unassisted human diagnostic methods. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of
agreement with this prompt (M = 3.89, SD = 2.092) was not significantly lower than 4,
t(96) = -.514, p = .0915, I have not found evidence to reject this statement, so the null
hypothesis was retained.
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A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H6, whether doctors thought that,
in general, physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnoses in healthcare. The null hypothesis was that in general, physicians did not
use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. The
results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this prompt (M = 3.74, SD =
1.904) was not significantly lower than 4, t(96) = -.1.340, p = .2965, I have not found
evidence to reject this statement, so the null hypothesis was retained.
A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H7, whether doctors thought that,
in general, physician knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to result
in a decrease in misdiagnosis. The null hypothesis was that in general, physicians’
knowledge of diagnostic software was not extensive enough to decrease misdiagnosis in
healthcare. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this prompt
(M = 3.99, SD = 1.921) was not significantly lower than 4, t(95) = -.053, p = .479, I have
not found evidence to reject this statement, so the null hypothesis was retained.
A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H8, whether doctors thought that,
in general, liability concerns prevented physicians from using diagnostic software. The
null hypothesis was that in general, liability concerns did not prevent physicians from
using diagnostic software. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement
with this prompt (M = 5.22, SD = 1.636) was not significantly lower than 4, t(96) =
7.297, p = 1.000, I have not found evidence to reject this statement, so the null hypothesis
was retained.
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Physicians thus indicated that they thought their personal use of diagnostic
software to be associated with error reduction, and in particular that their personal use of
diagnostic software was frequent enough for the purpose of error reduction. Interestingly,
doctors did not agree with the proposition that their knowledge of diagnostic software
was extensive enough for misdiagnosis reduction purposes. Additionally, doctors were
not personally deterred from using diagnostic software by liability concerns. When asked
to speak for their profession, physicians did not agree with the claims that (a) diagnostic
software use is associated with diagnostic error reduction, (b) diagnostic software is used
frequently enough to make a difference, (c) physician knowledge of diagnostic software
is extensive, and (d) physicians are deterred by liability concerns. As a result, I retained
the null hypothesis.
Interestingly, the results of hypothesis testing for the fifth through the eight null
hypotheses were the same when the one-sample t tests were run separately for those
physicians who had never used diagnostic software and those physicians who had used
diagnostic software. Additionally, all eight hypothesis tests were run again on separate
sub-samples. First, the sample was divided into men and women. Second, the sample was
divided into two groups of physicians, namely (a) those in family medicine, OB/GYN,
and internal medicine; and (b) those in every other specialty area. Third, the sample was
divided into physicians who were 40 or younger versus physicians who were over 40.
The results of hypothesis testing did not differ significantly on these subgroups; in no
case did a p value that was below .05 in Tables 18 and 19 change to .05 or over, and in no
case did a p value that was .05 or over in Tables 18 and 19 fall under 05. There is
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therefore some support for the claim that the findings of the study hold across gender,
specialty area, and physician age.
The implications of these findings relevant to the literature will be discussed
further in Chapter 5. Before proceeding to the discussion of findings, I will present
information about some of the assumptions of the one-sample t tests and procedures
related to non-parametric techniques.
Other Findings
According to Sheskin (2003), there are a number of assumptions that must be met
by the one-sample t test. One assumption is that the sample has been randomly drawn. In
this study, a randomly selected sub-population of 3,100 AMA-accredited physicians
through Survey Monkey yielded a sample of 99 physicians using the techniques
described in Chapter 3, so the assumption of randomness was met. The independence
assumption of the one-sample t test is that observations are independent. In this study,
each physician recorded one answer to every question independently from the other
participants, so the observations are independent from each other. Another assumption is
the use of interval or ratio data. Likert data is often treated as being interval data
(Sheskin, 2003), since the range of Likert scale in this study is 7 and the test statistic
comes from the sum of all of the responses from the respondents, so this assumption was
also met. A final statistical assumption of the one-sample t test is that the data pass a test
of normality such as the Shapiro-Wilk W test or the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. If
normality is not observed, then a non-parametric option to the one-sample t test, such as
the one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test, can be used. I ran tests of normality on each
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of the eight survey prompts associated with the hypotheses of the study as seen in Table
20.
Table 20
Tests of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Statistic
H1 My use of diagnostic
software is likely to
result in more
misdiagnoses in
healthcare than
unassisted human
diagnostic methods.
H2 I do not use
diagnostic software
frequently enough to
decrease misdiagnoses
in healthcare.
H3 My knowledge of
diagnostic software
is not extensive
enough to result in a
decrease in
misdiagnoses.

df

Shapiro-Wilk

Sig.

Statistic

df

Sig.

.339

55

.000

.716

55

.000

.248

55

.000

.858

55

.000

.236

55

.000

.850

55

.000
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Table 20
H4 Liability concerns do
not prevent me from
using diagnostic
software.
H5 In general, physicians
do not use diagnostic
software frequently
enough to decrease
misdiagnoses in
healthcare.
H6 In general, physicians’
use of diagnostic
software is likely to
result in more
misdiagnoses in
healthcare than
unassisted human
diagnostic methods.
H7 In general, physicians’
knowledge of
diagnostic software is
not extensive enough
to result in a decrease
in misdiagnoses.
H8 In general, liability
concerns do not
prevent physicians
from using diagnostic
software?

.327

55

.000

.795

55

.000

.182

55

.000

.887

55

.000

.216

55

.000

.884

55

.000

.199

55

.000

.912

55

.001

.273

55

.000

.808

55

.000

Note. a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

table continues
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Because the Shapiro-Wilk W and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of normality
both disclosed that the data for the eight prompts tested in the study were not distributed
normally, the one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was also conducted on the data. In
conducting the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, the null hypothesis in each instance was that
the median response ≥ 4. Because the interval data range for the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test are the same as for the one-sample t test, no further assumption testing was
conducted. Since a one-tailed approach was used, the directionality of the one-sample
Wilcoxon signed-rank test was ≥ 4 for each of the hypotheses.
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H1, whether
doctors’ personal use of diagnostic software was likely to result in more misdiagnoses in
healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods. The null hypothesis was that
personal diagnostic software use resulted in more misdiagnoses in healthcare than
unassisted human diagnostic methods. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of
agreement with this prompt (M = 2.47, SD = 2.008) was significantly lower than 4, t(96)
= 138.0, p < 0.001, so the null hypothesis was rejected. Some support was therefore
found for the alternative hypothesis, which was the claim that personal diagnostic
software use resulted in fewer misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human
diagnostic methods.
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H2, whether
doctors thought that they used diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnoses in healthcare. The null hypothesis was that physicians thought they did not
use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. The

91
results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this prompt (M = 3.24, SD =
1.934) was significantly lower than 4, t(96) = 273.0, p < 0.001, so the null hypothesis was
rejected. Some support was therefore found for the alternative hypothesis, which was
that physicians thought they used diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnosis in healthcare.
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H3, whether
doctors thought that their knowledge of diagnosis software was extensive enough to
result in a decrease in misdiagnoses. The null hypothesis was that doctors would agree
with this prompt. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this
prompt (M = 3.60, SD = 2.060) was significantly lower than 4, t(96) = 389.0, p < 0.001,
so the null hypothesis was rejected. Some support was therefore found for the alternative
hypothesis that doctors thought that their knowledge of diagnosis software was extensive
enough to result in a decrease in misdiagnoses.
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H4, whether
doctors thought that liability concerns prevent them from using diagnostic software. The
null hypothesis was that liability concerns did not prevent physicians from using
diagnostic software. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this
prompt (M = 5.31, SD = 1.990) was significantly higher than 4, t(96) = 1081.0, p = 0.99,
I have not found evidence to reject this statement, so the null hypothesis was retained.
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H5, whether
doctors thought that, in general, physician use of diagnostic software was likely to result
in more misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods. The null
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hypothesis was that, in general, diagnostic software use resulted in more misdiagnoses in
healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods. The results indicated that doctors’
mean level of agreement with this prompt (M = 3.89, SD = 2.092) was significantly lower
than 4, t(96) = 1337.5, p <0 .001, so the null hypothesis was rejected. Some support was
therefore found for the alternative hypothesis, which was the claim that general
diagnostic software use resulted in fewer misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted
human diagnostic methods.
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H6, whether
doctors thought that, in general, physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently
enough to decrease misdiagnoses in healthcare. The null hypothesis was that in general,
physicians thought they did not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnosis in healthcare. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement
with this prompt (M = 3.74, SD = 1.904) was significantly lower than 4, t(96) = 1557.5, p
= 0.001, so the null hypothesis was rejected. Some support was therefore found for the
alternative hypothesis, which was that physicians, in general, thought they used
diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H7, whether
doctors thought that, in general, physician knowledge of diagnostic software is not
extensive enough to result in a decrease in misdiagnosis. The null hypothesis was that in
general, physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software was not extensive enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of
agreement with this prompt (M = 3.99, SD = 1.921) was significantly lower than 4, t(96)
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= 1642.5, p = 0.008, so the null hypothesis was rejected. Some support was therefore
found for the alternative hypothesis that doctors thought that their knowledge of
diagnosis software was extensive enough to result in a decrease in misdiagnoses.
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H8, whether
doctors thought that, in general, liability concerns prevented physicians from using
diagnostic software. The null hypothesis was that in general, liability concerns did not
prevent physicians from using diagnostic software. The results indicated that doctors’
mean level of agreement with this prompt (M = 5.22, SD = 1.636) was not significantly
lower than 4, t(96) = 3458.5, p < 0.099, I have not found evidence to reject this statement,
so the null hypothesis was retained.
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Table 21
Hypothesis Testing Based on Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test (Personal Use)
Null Hypothesis

H1

H2

H3

H4

My use of diagnostic
software is likely to
result in more
misdiagnoses in
healthcare than
unassisted human
diagnostic method
I do not use diagnostic
software frequently
enough to decrease
misdiagnoses in
healthcare.
My knowledge of
Diagnostic Software is
not extensive enough
to result in a decrease
in misdiagnoses.

Wilcoxon
Test
Statistic

p (twotailed)

p (onetailed)

Result

138.0

<0.001

<0.001

Rejected

273.0

<0.001

<0.001

Rejected

389.0

<0.001

<0.001

Rejected

<0.001

0.99

Retained

Liability concerns do
not prevent me from
1081.0
using diagnostic software.
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Table 22
Hypothesis Testing Based on Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test (Physicians in General)
Null Hypothesis

H5

H6

H7

H8

In general, physicians’ use
Of diagnostic software is
likely to result in more
misdiagnoses in healthcare
than unassisted human
diagnostic methods.
In general, physicians do
not use diagnostic software
frequently enough to
decrease misdiagnoses
in healthcare.
In general, physicians’
knowledge of diagnostic
software is not extensive
enough to result in a
decrease in misdiagnoses.
In general, liability
concerns do not
prevent physicians from
using diagnostic software.

Wilcoxon p (twoTest
tailed)
Statistic

p (onetailed)

Result

1337.5

<0.001

<0.001

Rejected

1557.5

0.001

0.001

Rejected

1642.5

0.020

0.008

Rejected

3458.5

0.01

<0.099

Retained

One-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were conducted to evaluate H1 and H5,
whether doctors use of diagnostic software were likely to result in more misdiagnoses in
healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods. Speaking for themselves and the
profession, the results indicated that doctors’ mean levels of agreement with these
prompts were significantly lower than 4, so the null hypotheses were rejected. Some
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support were therefore found for the alternative hypotheses, which were the claims that
diagnostic software use resulted in fewer misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted
human diagnostic methods.
One-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were conducted to evaluate H2 and H6,
whether doctors thought that they used diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease
misdiagnoses in healthcare. Speaking for themselves and the profession, the results
indicated that doctors’ mean levels of agreement with these prompts were significantly
lower than 4, so the null hypotheses were rejected. Some support were therefore found
for the alternative hypotheses, which were the claims that physicians thought they used
diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnoses in healthcare.
One-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were conducted to evaluate H3 and H7,
whether doctors thought that their knowledge of diagnostic software are not extensive
enough to result in decrease in misdiagnoses. Speaking for themselves and the profession,
the results indicated that doctors’ mean levels of agreement with these prompts were
significantly lower than 4, so the null hypotheses were rejected. Some supports were
therefore found for the alternative hypotheses, which were the claims that physicians
knowledge of diagnostic software are not extensive enough to result in a decrease in
misdiagnoses.
One-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were conducted to evaluate H4 and H8,
whether doctors thought that liability concerns did not prevent them from using
diagnostic software. Speaking for themselves and the profession, the results indicated that
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doctors’ mean levels of agreement with this prompt were significantly higher than 4, I
have not found evidence to reject this statement, so the null hypotheses were retained.
Summary
The answers to the research questions of the study were as follows:
Research Question 1: Does use of diagnostic software decrease misdiagnosis in
healthcare versus unassisted human diagnostic methods? Speaking for themselves,
physicians did not agree with the null hypothesis that personal diagnostic software use
resulted in more misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods.
Therefore, I can conclude that the physicians believe that personal diagnostic software
results in fewer misdiagnoses than unassisted human diagnostic methods. Speaking for
the profession, I would say that there is insufficient evidence to refute the null hypothesis
that general diagnostic software use resulted in more misdiagnoses in healthcare than
unassisted human diagnostic methods.
Research Question 2: Do physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare? Speaking for themselves, but not for the profession
in general, physicians did not agree with the null hypothesis that they did not use
diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. Therefore,
I can conclude that the physicians believe frequent use that personal diagnostic software
results in fewer misdiagnoses than unassisted human diagnostic methods. Speaking for
the profession in general, I would conclude that there is insufficient evidence to refute the
null hypothesis that physicians did not use diagnostic software frequently enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.
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Research Question 3: Is physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software extensive
enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare? Speaking for themselves and the
profession, I would say that there is insufficient evidence to refute the null hypothesis
that physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software was not extensive enough to decrease
misdiagnosis in healthcare.
Research Question 4: Do liability concerns prevent physicians from using
diagnostic software? Speaking for both themselves and the profession, there is
statistically significant evidence that the doctors in the sample have a different opinion
than “neither agree or disagree”. Majority of the physicians in this sample thought that
liability concerns were not preventing physicians from using diagnostic software.
Having arrived at these results, the focus of the fifth and concluding chapter of the
study will be on relating these findings to previous empirical findings and theoretical
models, acknowledging limitations, and providing recommendations for scholars and
practitioners.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative study was to draw upon physician-provided data
to determine why, at least in physicians’ opinions, the prevalence of misdiagnosis has
remained high despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software. The study was
carried out in a quantitative, cross-sectional manner that relied primarily on the
inferential technique of the one-sample t test, Wilcoxon Signed Ranked test, and the
administration of a diagnostic software attitudes and usage survey of 3,100 AMAaccredited physicians of whom 97 completed the survey. The purpose of this study was to
measure physicians’ attitudes to diagnostic software in a manner that could identify
physician-perceived hindrances to and benefits of the use of diagnostic software.
In addressing the question of why the widespread adoption of diagnostic software
has not coincided with a decrease in the prevalence of misdiagnosis, I used a quantitative
approach to determine which of some of the possible answers to this question—
diagnostic software insufficiency, insufficient/improper use by physicians, or liability—is
more popular with physicians and to determine whether answers to this question vary
significantly depending on the demographic and professional characteristics of
physicians, with an emphasis on gender, specialty area, and physician age.
AMA offers a master list of U.S.-licensed physicians through their professional database
licensees. I contacted one the licensees that provided a list of 3,100 physicians. I sent
recruitment emails to these AMA-accredited physicians and invited them to complete my
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questionnaire on Survey Monkey platform. A total of 99 physicians responded from
where I collected the data for the analysis.
All of the survey questions differentiated between doctors’ own use of diagnostic
software and their general perceptions about diagnostic software. Responses for all of the
survey questions were conducted on a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 = completely disagree,
2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 5 = somewhat
agree, 6 = agree, and 7 = completely agree.
To determine the relationship between the variables, for the first two research
questions of the study, the independent variable was whether diagnostic software was
used and the dependent variable was reduction of misdiagnosis. For the third research
question of the study, the independent variable was knowledge of diagnostic software and
the dependent variable was reduction of misdiagnosis. For the fourth research question of
the study, the independent variable was liability concern and the dependent variable was
use of diagnostic software. I used the online survey tool, SurveyMonkey, to collect
research data and the SPSS computing application to analyze the data. I conducted two
one-tailed one-sample t tests on each survey question and used tables to report the result
of the survey data.
Research Question 1
For Research Question 1, in the survey I asked if physicians thought the use
diagnostic software helped to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare versus unassisted
human diagnostic methods. The result of my analysis led to rejection of H01. Speaking
for themselves, but not for the profession in general, physicians indicated their thought
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that diagnostic software did in fact decrease misdiagnosis versus unassisted human
diagnostic methods.
Research Question 2
For Research Question 2, I asked in the survey if physicians use diagnostic
software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. The result of my
analysis led to rejection of H02. Speaking for themselves, but not for the profession in
general, physicians indicated their belief that they used diagnostic software frequently
enough to detect misdiagnoses in healthcare.
Research Question 3
For Research Question 3, I asked in the survey if physicians’ knowledge of
diagnostic software was extensive enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.
Speaking for both themselves and the profession in general, physicians did not indicate
that there was enough knowledge of diagnostic software to decrease misdiagnoses in
healthcare. I have not found evidence to reject this statement, so my analysis resulted in
retaining H03.
Research Question 4
For Research Question 4, I asked if liability concerns prevent physicians from
using diagnostic software. Speaking for both themselves and the profession in general,
there is statistically significant evidence that the doctors in the sample have a different
opinion than “neither agree or disagree”. If I had done a two-tailed test, I would have
rejected the null hypothesis that the doctors would neither agree or disagree that liability
concerns prevent physicians from using diagnostic software. The majority of the
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physicians in this sample clearly indicated that liability concerns would not prevented
physicians from using diagnostic software.
The results of hypothesis testing for the first and second null hypotheses were
rejected using both one-sample t tests and one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
Therefore, one-sample t test and one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test agreed on this
result. The results of hypothesis testing for the fourth and eighth null hypotheses were the
same when one-sample t tests and one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test were run
separately for those physicians who thought liability concerns did not prevent them from
using diagnostic software.
Finally, the results of hypothesis testing for the Null Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, and 7 that
were rejected using one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were not rejected using one
sample t test. These results indicated that there were statistically significant difference
between one-sample t test and one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Since the findings
of the one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests in this instance were not in accordance
with the findings of the one-sample t tests, the limitation of non normality did appear to
compromise the results of the study. The purpose of the previous chapter of the study was
to present and comment on the statistical characteristics of the results associated with the
study. The purpose of the present chapter of the study is to (a) summarize the relevant
findings, (b) explore the implications of the findings with respect to the literature
reviewed in Chapter 2, (c) generate recommendations for scholars and physicians, (d)
discuss the limitations of the study, and (e) discuss the significance of the study. Each of
these purposes will be addressed in a separate section of the chapter.
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Summary of Findings
The research question-based findings of the study were as follows. First, physicians
disagreed that their personal use of diagnostic software was likely to result in more
misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods. Thus, there is
statistical support for the conclusion that physicians in the sample thought that use of
diagnostic software was likely to result in less misdiagnoses than unassisted human
diagnostic methods. This is an important facet of the findings in that it exhibits the
perception of value of diagnostic software on behalf of physicians. Second, I asked in the
survey if physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnoses
in healthcare. Speaking for themselves, but not for the profession in general, physicians
disagreed that they did not personally use diagnostic software frequently enough to
decrease misdiagnoses in healthcare. On the other hand, speaking for the profession in
general, there is insufficient statistical evidence to refute the null hypothesis that
physicians did not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnoses in
healthcare. Finally, there was evidence that suggested fairly strongly that physicians
agreed that liability concerns did not prevent them from using diagnostic software and
that physicians agreed that physicians in general were not prevented from using
diagnostic software because of liability concerns.

In the next section of this chapter, these findings will be discussed in relation to
the existing literature on diagnostic software. Particular attention will be paid to the ways
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in which the findings of the study complement, contradict, or add context to the existing
empirical findings as well as to theories of diagnostic software use.
Relation of Findings to Literature
Perhaps the most important finding in the current study with respect to the
existing literature was the finding that physicians did not think that the use of diagnostic
software would result in more misdiagnoses than unassisted human diagnostic methods.
This finding can be interpreted as an endorsement of diagnostic software. If, in
physicians’ opinions, the use of diagnostic software is likely to result in fewer diagnostic
errors than unaided human diagnostics, then diagnostic software is serving its intended
function of improving clinical outcomes. If so, then the appropriate follow-up question is
to ask why, if physicians endorse the clinical usefulness of diagnostic software,
misdiagnosis continues to be such a pressing problem in the American healthcare system.
While this question was not directly posed to the participants in the study, an answer to it
can nonetheless be inferred from the fact that 42 of the 97 participants in the study, or just
over 43% of the participants, had never used any form of diagnostic software as of the
time of being surveyed. However, physicians in the sample seemed to think they used the
diagnostic software enough to decrease misdiagnoses than unassisted human diagnostic
methods. They just thought other doctors have used it enough. To address such a great
discrepancy, I would recommend that future researchers seek to determine not only the
usage rates and confidence of doctors in relation to diagnostic software but also the cost.
It might be true that diagnostic software is clinically effective but not widespread
enough to lower misdiagnosis in a significant way. If so, then it is natural to ask why the
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adoption rate of diagnostic software is not higher. Technology adoption theories typically
share the assumption that technology is adopted to the extent that it is found useful by
adopters, barring mitigating factors such as high expense, the absence of organizational
support, and high effort of use (Shah & Gardner, 2008; Spekowius & Wendler, 2006;
Van Grembergern & De Haes, 2009). While these factors were not measured in the
current study, the existing literature suggests that diagnostic software is relatively easy to
use and is not expensive relative to other items of medical technology (Menachemi et al.,
2009; Renz et al., 2012; Seeley, 2009; Shield et al., 2010). Additionally, I found that
liability was not a concern for physicians’ vis-à-vis diagnostic software. The main
uninvestigated variable is likely institutional support. It is not clear, at least based on the
existing research, whether the use of diagnostic software is institutionally supported in
the American healthcare establishment. The absence of such support would help to
explain the otherwise paradoxical finding that physicians find diagnostic software to be
useful in reducing medical error while overall adoption of this technology remains
relatively low.
Relation of Findings to Theory
The questions in the study were not designed to explore the roles or
characteristics of the three theoretical roots of diagnosis—that is, computing, satisficing,
and intuition. However, the findings did not generally support the planned behavior
model (Ajzen, 2005). Physicians who had not actually used diagnostic software had the
same kinds of opinions about its usefulness and capabilities as physicians who had used

106
diagnostic software. As discussed in Chapter 4, the one-sample t test results for non
adopters and adopters of diagnostic software yielded the same hypothesis testing results.
Clearly, then, there are many nonadopters of diagnostic software that nonetheless
have a positive view of such software and who might not have adopted the software
because of institutional pressures or other structural reasons. One of the shortcomings of
the planned behavior model in this regard is that it is not as adept at measuring the impact
of external forces, such as organizational mandates, in the formation of individual
behavior. Future scholars who study the adoption or non adoption of diagnostic software
among physicians might be better served with a theoretical model more capable of
measuring environmental and institutional pressures.
Limitations of the Study
One of the statistical limitations of the study that became apparent during the
process of data analysis was that three medical specialties—family medicine, OB/GYN,
and internal medicine—represented more than 56% of the entire sample. The analysis in
Chapter 4 revealed that segmenting the sample into the three medical specialties versus
all other specialties did not result in any non significant p values becoming significant or
significant p values becoming non significant. Future researchers who draw a sample of
physicians that is more balanced with respect to medical specialty can likely overcome
this limitation. In more general terms, the small size of the study (N = 97) is likely to
constitute an innate limit to the validity and reliability of results (note that the measured
Cronbach’s Alpha was .761); studies with significantly larger samples might find that the
results of the present study might not be replicated. Another limitation of the study was
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that the data for the eight survey prompts relating to diagnostic software use were not
normally distributed, leading to the supplemental use of the one-sample Wilcoxon
signed-rank test.
Recommendations for Scholars and Physicians
One appropriate recommendation for future researchers is to draw a sample of
physicians that is more balanced with respect to the representation of different medical
specialties. The fact that over half of the respondents came from three of the 24
occupations surveyed did not significantly impact the results of hypothesis testing, but
drawing a larger and more balanced collection of specialty areas might nonetheless
improve future results. It would also be appropriate for scholars to attempt to understand
the apparent paradox of physicians’ thoughts in the clinical utility of diagnostic software
combined with a low adoption rate. This may be due to the economic factors associated
with diagnostic software. It is recommended that future researchers seek to determine not
only the usage rates and confidence of doctors in relation to diagnostic software but also
the cost. Given that 43% of respondents have not adopted diagnostic software, yet a
substantial proportion of respondents find such software to be valuable, there must be
additional variables that this study failed to address.
The current study contained no findings that can explain this apparent paradox. It
might be the case that physicians find diagnostic software useful in personal practice but
they are not allowed to use it in certain practice settings. Alternatively, the costs
associated with establishing a diagnostic software-capable system may be too great for
smaller organizations. Whatever the case, scholars ought to investigate this paradox
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further; a study with a larger sample might find that the paradox does not exist at all and
that physicians’ opinions of the usefulness of diagnostic software are aligned with the
actual adoption rate of diagnostic software.
A recommendation for physicians is to speak more frequently to their peers about
both the benefits and disadvantages of diagnostic software. Roughly, 43% of participants
in the current study were non adopters of diagnostic software; the 57% of physicians who
were adopters to initiate a dialogue with non adopting peers and to share information
could be instrumental in promoting diagnostic software adoption. Communication
amongst medical professionals related to diagnostic software may also help to identify
the most effective products available to suit their specific needs. In addition, the
existence of such dialogue could help physicians who have already adopted diagnostic
software to learn and adopt best practices in the use of such software from more
advanced peers.
Significance of the Study
Diagnostic software is a popular, cost-efficient, and clinically powerful healthcare
tool (O’Malley et al., 2010; Puech et al., 2009; Randeree, 2007). The purpose of this
quantitative, survey-based study was to draw upon physician-provided data to determine
why, at least in physicians’ opinions, the prevalence of misdiagnosis has remained high
despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software. It was found that physicians
thought diagnostic software to be more capable of reducing misdiagnosis than unassisted
human diagnosis, which can be interpreted as a general endorsement of diagnostic
software. However, overall adoption of diagnostic software remained low. The study was
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significant because the results provided empirical insight to this apparent paradox, which
might be explained through the variable of institutional support for diagnostic software.
Additionally, I presented findings that called attention to the absence of gender-,
specialty-, and age-related differences, which might suggest that physicians’ attitudes to
diagnostic software are related to core concerns of the profession rather than to
demographic differences.
Implications for Social Change
The social significance of the study lies in its affirmation of the usefulness of diagnostic
software, at least in the opinion of physicians. Medical misdiagnosis is an enormously
costly social problem in terms of lives lost and health compromised; according to Leavitt
and Leavitt (2011), approximately 100,000 people die every year in the United States
because of misdiagnosis. If physicians themselves think that diagnostic software is
superior to unassisted human diagnosis, as was found in the current study, then there is
additional support for the use of diagnostic software to reduce the incidence of
misdiagnosis. If this study contributes, however modestly, to the increased adoption of
diagnostic software, then it will have helped to address the various social problems—
including problems of lost life, health, and productivity—caused by misdiagnosis. Thus,
the main implication for social change in the study is its support for the broader use of
diagnostic software by physicians, which might result in the lowering of misdiagnosis.
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Appendix A: Diagnostic Software Survey Form for Study
Management of Diagnostic Software Survey Form for Study

1.

To which of the following types of diagnostic medical software have you ever had
access?
Isabel
DXplain
Your Rapid Diagnosis
DiagnosisPro
Connectance
Other___________________
None (Please skip Questions 2 – 12)

2.

Which of the following types of diagnostic medical software have you ever used?
Isabel
DXplain
Your Rapid Diagnosis
DiagnosisPro
Connectance
Other___________________
None (Please skip Questions 3 – 12)

3.

How long have you had access to diagnostic medical software?
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0 - 6 months
6 months – 1 year
1 - 3 years
3 - 5 years
More than 5 years

4.

How long have you used diagnostic medical software?
0 - 6 months
6 months – 1 year
1 - 3 years
3 - 5 years
More than 5 years

5.

To which of the following types of diagnostic medical software do you currently
have access?
Isabel
DXplain
Your Rapid Diagnosis
DiagnosisPro
Connectance
Other_________________
None
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6.

Which of the following types of diagnostic medical software do you currently
use?
Isabel
DXplain
Your Rapid Diagnosis
DiagnosisPro
Connectance
Other___________________
None

7.

How long have you been using the software you are currently using?
0 - 6 months
6 months – 1 year
1 - 3 years
3 - 5 years
More than 5 years

(Questions 8 – 12 are individual in nature)
8.

My use of diagnostic software is likely to result in more misdiagnoses in
healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods?
Strongly Disagree
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Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
Not Applicable

9.

I do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in
healthcare?
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
Not Applicable

10.

My knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough that I am able to use
it effectively?
Strongly Disagree
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Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
Not Applicable

11.

My knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to result in a
decrease in misdiagnosis?
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
Not Applicable

12.

Liability concerns do not prevent me from using diagnostic software?
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
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Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
Not Applicable

(Questions 13 – 16 are general in nature)
13.

In general, physicians’ use of diagnostic software is likely to result in more
misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods?
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
Not Applicable

14.

In general, physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?
Strongly Disagree
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Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
Not Applicable

15.

In general, physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough
to result in a decrease in misdiagnosis?
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
Not Applicable

16.

In general, liability concerns do not prevent physicians from using diagnostic
software?
Strongly Disagree
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Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
Not Applicable

17

What is your gender?
Male
Female
Transgender

18.

How old are you?
Less than 30 years old
30-40 years old
41-50 years old
51-60 years old
61-65 years old
More than 65 years old

19.

How long have you had a license to practice medicine?
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Less than 5 years
5-10 years
11-20 years
21-30 years
More than 30 years

20.

What is your specialty area? ____________________________________

21.

In what area of the U.S. do you practice medicine?
New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, Vermont)
Mid-Atlantic (New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania)
South Atlantic (Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia)
South (Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, Texas)
Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin)
Mountain (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah,
Wyoming)
Pacific (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington)

